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Macroeconomic  Adjustment  and  Growth
This paper-  a product of the Macroeconomic Adjustment and Growth Division, Countrv Economics
Department - is part of a larger effort in PRE to develop a macroeconomic projection model that will
improve and extend the Bank's RIMSM  model.  Copies are available iree from the World Bank,  1818 H
Street NW, Washington DC 2W33. Please contact Raquel Luz, room N 1  1-057, extension 34303 (82 pages
with figures and tables).
Easterly, Hwa, Kongsamut, and Zizek assess the  detail on the tax and banking systems.  They usc
macroeconomic policy regime required for  the extended model to discuss macre  conomic
structural economic reform in trade and financial  adjustments needed for policy reforri, being
policy.  To do so, they develop a macroecon-  considered in Colombia for trade (reduced tariff
omic model for deriving the appropriate stance  rates and relaxed import quotas), finance (re-
on macroeconomic policies needed to support  duced reserve requiremerits and forced invest-
structural reform measures in trade and finance.  ment requirements for the banking system), and
reducing inflation.
The macroeconomic projection model of
Colombia they use is an extension of the Bank's  AU the policy reforms require fiscal adjust-
Revised Mlinimum Standard Model (RMSM)  ment to be consistent with available financing.
currently in use.  They enrich the traditional  For example, reduced tariff rates mean lost
RMSM by adding fiscal and monetary identities  revenues, which must be compensated by
as well as behavioral  functions for the following  revenue increases elsewhere or spending cuEs.
variables:  private  consumption, private invest-  The incipient increase in import  demand because
ment, money demand,  demand for quasi money,  of reduced tariffs requires more currency depre-
export supply, and import demand.  ciation, although  not as much as the increase in
the tariff rate. Quota reduction  also requires
They illustrate how Lhe  basic model func-  some currency depreciation.
tions by comparing three simulations to a base
case run, increasing lhe targets for three vari-  All scenarios require reeucing public
ables:  the real exchange rate, the real intcrest  investunent if no other fiscal measures are taken.
rate, and the inflation rate.  Since reducing public investment lowers growth,
these simulations dramatize the need to pursue
All three simulations increase the  Tinhance-  fiscal reforms that compensate for the adverse
able fiscal deficit, but in differcnt ways.  A  fiscal effects of trade or financial liberalization
target of rcal exchange rate appreciation in-  without reducing urgent social spending or
creases it by making more foreign credit avail-  investments in public infrastructure.
able to the public sector.  Higher targets for real
interest and inflation rates increase it by making  The model does not try to capture the
more domestic credit available.  favorable effects of reforrn on efficiency and
growth, which other evidence suggests would be
They then extend the model to take into  large enough to raise growth in the long run
account the external financing constraint facing  even if there were an ill-advised reduction in
the government and the economy, and by adding  public investment.
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1.  The  Colombia  macro  model  presented  in this  paper  is part of  a  family
of macromodels  being  prepared  by the  Macroeconomic  Adjustment  and  Growth
Division  in  collaboration  with colleagues  in  Operations  for  use in projections
and evaluation  of adjustment  programs. These  models  represent  a cont inuum  of
economic  and  programming  compiexity. The  projection  models  known as RMSM-X
are intended  to be the successor  to the 3ank's  RMSM (Revised  Minimum  Standard
Model)  model,  with the  main improvement  being the  inclusion  of fiscal  and
monetary  identities  in addition  to the  traditional  external  balance  and
saving-investment  identities. These  models  embody  simple  projection  rules  and
are solved  recursively  to obtain  whatever  are defined  to be the residual
variables.
2.  At the  next level  of complexity,  the  models  known  as RMSM-XX  will
cover  the same  ground  as RMSM-X,  but  will incorporate  behavioral  functions  for
the  main macroeconomic  variables. They  will be estimated  for  countries  where
the  data and structural  characteristics  permit. They  will be solved
simultaneously  to obtain  relative  prices  that  clear  goods  markets  and
financial  markets.  Finally  the  highest  level  of complexity  will be  macro
models  knowv  as MACOR  that  will be state-of-the-art  macro-econometric  models.
3.  The  model  presented  in this  paper is in-between  RMSM-X  and RMSM-XX  in
that--unlike  RMSM-X--it  does incorporate  behavioral  functions  for the  main
macroeconomic  variables,  namly  private  consumption,  private  investment,  money
deand,  demand  for  quasi-money,  export  supply.  and import  demand. However,
unlike  3MSM-XX  but  like  RMSM-X,  it is solved  recursively  for residual-2-
variables. The  oser specifies  'target  values'  for  the real  exchangr  rate,
real  interest  rate,  and the  inflation  rate.  The  model then  determines  t'.e
public  sector  behavior  consistent  with attaining  these  targets. In  an
alternative  solution,  described  in  Appendix  II, the  mode'.  also  permits
setting  exogenously  the  public  sector  variables  and determining  the  private
sector  behavior  necessary  to reach  the  policy  targets. Finally,  the  model  is
generalized  to  take  into  account  external  financing  constraints  by  making  the
real  exchange  rate  endogenous. The  model is used  to derive  the  macro
adjustment  required  by trade  and financial  liberalization.
PART I:  TEE  BASIC  MODEL
LI.  DESCRIPTION  OF THE  MODEL
4.  The struLture  of the  model  can  be explained  by looking  at its  three
key ingredients:  the  accounting  framework,  the  behavioral  equations  and
projection  rules  for  the  variables,  and the  choice  of residual  variables  to
satisfy  the  accounting  iden.ities. Some illustrative  simulations  will then  be
presented  to show  how the  model  works.
A.  Boring  Accounting
5.  The  model  uses  the  flow-of-funds  accounting  framework  presented  in
Easterly  (1989),  which  is  consistent  with  the  framework  presented  in  RMSM-X
examples  such  as  Holsen  (1389)  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  et  al.  (1989).  This
framework  reconciles  historical  data  on  income,  expenditure,  saving.
investment,  and  financing  flows  of  different  actors  in  the  economy.  The-3-
accounting  identities  are  then  also  used as  part  of the  projection  model to
. ure that  budget  constraints  are  observed  for  each of the sectors.
6.  In  this application,  we use the  minimum  number  of  sectors;  the
consol.dated  public  sector,  the  banking  system,1 the  nonfinancial  --ivate
sector,  and the  external  sector. Other  applications  of RMSM-X  may  wish to
consider  breaking  the  public  sector  down into  the  budgetary  and extra-
budgetary  accounts  and  distinguishing  the  banking  system  between  the  central
bank  and the rest (the  latter  will be done in  Part II).  In this application,
the  simplest  possible  sectoral  breakdown  seemed  appropriate  because  additiona 1
complexity  will be introduced  by specifying  behavioral  functions  for  the
private  sector.
7.  The consistent  macroeconomic  accounts  for  1988  are  presented  in the
matrix  in Table  1 on the  next page (defin!.tions  of the  variables  follow  Table
1).  A  similar  exercise  was done for  1986  and 1981,  but is not shown. The
construction  of this type  of a matrix  is  detailed  in  Easterly  (1989).
Briefly,  it reconciles  current  income  and  expenditure  with capital  expenditure
and financing  flows. The  current  income  and  expenditure  is in the  upper  left-
hand quarter  of the  matrix,  with expenditure  flows  shown  down  and income  flows
shown  across. The  organizing  principle  of the  matrix,  and  of the  macro
accourte  in general,  is that  expenditure  by one sector  will be the income  of
another  sector. In addition  to the  four rows  and  columns  for  the four
sectors,  there  will be another  row  and  column  for the  national  accounts,  which
1/ The  'banking  system'  is  defined  to  include  the  following  Colombian
financial  intermediaries:  commercial  banks,  corPoraciones  financieras
(development  finance  corporations),  corporaciones  de  ahorro  v  vivienda
(savings  and  loan  companies),  and  compaftias  de  financiamento  commercial
(finance  companies).1'~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~C-or 
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Current  Account  Variabloe
Cg  Covernment  Consumption
Cp  Private  Consumption
DRS  Depreciation,  Interest  and  Retained  Earnings  from  other  Public  Sector
Ngm Ngp  Interest  paymenti  on debt  to  Private  sector
Ngf  Public  sector  interest  payments  on External  debt
NKnei  Interest  payments  on  Capital  nei
NmfANpf  Privato  sector  interest  paymonts  on  Extornal  debt
NNFAcb  Interost  on  Central  Bank  Reserves
NSgf  Public  sector  intorest  paymonts  on Short  Term  External  debt
NSpf  Private  sector  intorest  payments  on Short  Term  Extnrnal  debt
OthR  Other  revenues  of  Public  sector
Prof  Profit  Remittances  abroad
RC  Resource  Cap (Imports  CNFS-Exports  ChFS)
Sf  Current  Account  Doficit
Sg  Publie  Savings
Sp  Private  Savings
Td  Direct  Taxes
Tfp  Transfers  from  External  sector  to  Private  sector
Tgp  Transfers  from  Public  soctor  to  Private  sector
Ti  Indirect  Taxes
Subg  Subsidios
Yfcp  Factor  Income  of  Private  sector
Capital  Account  Variables
DFI  O;rect  Foreign  Investment
Ig  Public  Investment
Ip  Private  Investment
it  Total  Investment
Knei  Capital  not elsewhere  included
Lfg  Extornal  Crvdit  to  Public  soctor
Lfm  External  Credis  to  Financial  system
Lfp  External  Credit  to  Private  sector
Lop  Credit  from  Public  to  Private  sector
Log  Credit  from  Financial  to  Public  sector
LOp  Crdiit  from  Finascial  soctor  to Private  sector
Lpg  Credit  from  Privat,  to Public  sector
LSfq  Short  Trm  External  Credit  to  Public  sector
LSfp  Short  Term  External  Credit  to  Privxto  sector
WI  Money
NFAcb  Reserves  of tho Contral  Bank
NFAof  Reserves  of other  Financial  Institutions
NFAd  Discrepancy  term  betwoon  IMF  and  RMSM  estimates  of  Reserves
NOL  Not Other  Liabilities  of  Financial  System
NOLg  Net Other  Liabilities  of  Government
QW  Quasi-money-6.
represents  factor  income  received  from  participating  in  production,  and
expenditure  on  the  output  of  that  production.  Thus,  this  row  and  colwmn
represents  the  expenditure  and  income  breakdowns,  respectively,  of  total  GOP
8.  The  balancing  item  for  each  sector's  current  account  is  saving.  shown
in  the  lower  left-hand  quarter  of  the  matrix.  This  insures  that  current
inceme  equal  current  uses  since  the  latter  is  defined  to  include  saving.
Thus,  the  totals  of  *ach  of  the  first  five  rows  wvil be  Aqual  to  the  total  of
the  corresponding  column  of  the  matrix.
9.  Saving  is  also  the  balancing  item  of  the  capital  account  of  each
sector,  which  is  shown  in  the  remainder  of  the  matrix. 2 The  lower  right-hand
quarter  of  the  matrix  represents  the  financing  flows  for  each  sector  (or  what
is  known  as  *below  the  line for  the  public  sector  and  balance  of  payments
accounts).  The  upper  right-hand  quarter  gives  the  fixed  capital  formation  of
each  sector.  The  sum  of  investment  is  equated  to  total  saving,  which  is  the
capital  account  equivalent  of  the  GDP  income-expenditure  identity  in  the
current  account.
10.  For  each  of  the  c--tors.  the  equality  of  the  capital  account  row  and
column  says  that  the  sum  of  their  total  uses  of  financing  is  equivalent  to  the
total  of  their  sources  of  financing,  with  the  latter  including  own  saving.  To
put  it  another  way,  the  excess  of  investment  over  saving  is  equal  to  the  net
borrowing  from  domestic  and  external  sources  for  each  sector.
2/  This  does  not  mean  that  saving  it  the  residual  for  both  current  and
capital  accounts  when  actually  estimating  the  entries  in  the  matrix.
Another  residual  variable  is  needed  for  the  capital  account  to  balance
the  matrix  during  estimation.7-
S.  Behavioral  Equations,  Projection  Rules,  and  Other  Stories
11.  There  are  three  methods  used  to  project  the  variables  in  the  model,
depending  on  what  we think  is  most  appropriate  for  the  variable  in question.
The  first  method  is  to use  a behavioral  equation  derived  from  standard
macroeconomic  theory,  sometimes  w'..h  the  parameters  estimated  econometrically.
The  second  method  is  a  proje:tton  rule  that  the  variable  is  assumed  to
maintain  *ho  **mo  restl^  t^'  r  ;o,  ,o  ouavr ruiuvanL.  activity  variable) as
the  estimated  ratio  in  the  base  year  (1989)  or,  in  some  cases,  as  the  average
of the  historical  years  ('986-89).  Finally,  some  va-lables  are  specified
exogenously.
12.  The  only  variables  Lor  which  behavioral  equati,ns  are  used  are
private  investment,  money  demand,  demand  for  quasi-money,  export  supply,
import  demand,  and  private  consumption.  The  ratio  of real  private  investment
to real  GDP  is  given  as a function  of the  real  domestic  interest  rate.
Nominal  money  demand  also  has  an  elasticity  of  one  with respect  to  nominal
GDP,  as  well  as responding  to the  rate  of (expected)  inflation.  The  nominal
demand  for  quasi-money  is  proportional  to  nominal  GDP, 3 with  the  proportion
depending  on the (expected)  real  interest  rate. Short-term  external  capital
inflows  are  the  residual  for  the  private  sector  balance  sheet. This
specification  implies  that  foreign  and  domestic  assets  are  imperfect
substitutes  for  the  private  sector.  The  expected  inflation  term  in the  money
and  quasi-money  functions  is  the  a  .al  inflation  rate  assumed  for  the
projection.  This  can  be seen  also  as  s  proxy  for  expected  devaluation  (after
subtracting  international  inflation).  Private  consumption  (in  current  prices)
is  assumed  to  be proportional  to  nominal  disposa'ble  income  (with  some
3/  In the  extended  model  quasi-money  is  made  proportional  to  wealth.adjustments to correct  for  the inflation  tax  component  of interest  income  and
to avoid  simultaneity,  as described  in  Appendix  I)
13.  Goods exports  are  broken  down into  eight  categories:  coffee,  crude
oil, fuel oil,  gold,  coal,  nickel,  manufactures,  and  other.  All but the last
two are  thought  to depend  on special  factors  apart from  macroeconomic
conditions,  and so are  projected  exooenously  in dollars. 4 Manufactures  and
gothetz  exports  are  each proiected  to have  an elasticity  of  one  with respect
to real  GDP and  an  econometrically-estimatee  elasticity  with respect  to the
real  exchange  rate (see  Appendix  1).S
14.  Goods imports  are  broken  down into  three  categories:  consumption
goods,  capital  goods,  and  r'ermediate  inputs. The first  two  categories  are
further  disaggregated  into  public  and  private  imports  of those  goods.  Private
consumption  goods imports.  private  capital  goods imports,  and intermediate
inputs  are all assumed  to have an income  elasticity  of one and  an elasticity
to the real exchange  rate that  is  estimated  econometrically. Public  consump-
tion  and capital  goods imports  are  assumed  to be proportional  to public
consumption  and investment,  respectively.
15.  Other  variables  in the  model  are  projected  using simple  ratios. All
of  the fiscal  income  and  expenditure  variables  're projected  as ratios  to  GDP,
with the exception  of  indirect  taxes,  which are  specified  as a combination  of
41  Of course,  comaodity  exports  are  not  completely  ind6pendent  of
macroeconomic  conditions,  but the  amount  of detail  required  to model
then  endogenously  would  greatly  complicate  the  modol.  The assumption
that  we use is that the  quantity  exported  is determined  by  capacity.
5/  This export  supply  function  supposes  lnfinitely  eleastic  demand  for
Colombian  products. This is because  Colombia  is presumed  to be small
relative  to its  market  in these  products.-9-
trade  taxes  maintaining  a fixed  proportion  to impor:s,  and other  indirect
taxes  held constant  relative  to GDP.
16.  Financial  asset  variables  such  as private  holding  of government  debt
and  net other  liabilities  of the  banking  system  are projected  as fixed  ratios
to quasi-money. The flow  of credit  to the  private  sector  is  projected  as a
fixed  ratio  to private  investment.
17.  All interest  flows  in the  model  are  projected  by  multiplying  the
interest  rate  applicable  to each  kind of debt times  the  corresponding  debt
stock  from  the  previous  period. The interest  rates  on external  debt  are
projected  to  move in l'ne  with LIBOR.  The  domestic  real  interest  rate is
fixed  as a target  rate in  the  model.  so that  the  nominal  interest  rate  will
move  with inflation. The interest  rate  on domestic  government  debt can  be
either  fixed  in  nominal  terms  or set  to  move together  with the  overall
domestic  interest  rate.
18.  Since  the  current  income  and  expenditure  of the banking  system  is
assumed  to be zero for  simplicity,  the  interest  income  and expenditure
associated  with assets  and liabilities  of the  banking  system  is assigned  to
the  private  sector. This  does  not lead  to any  effective  change  in  behavior  if
we assume  that  the  net profits  of the  banking  system  would  have been remitted
to the  private  sector  in any  case.  Ths  only significant  exception  is the
central  bank (Banco  de la Re$pblica),  but this is  assumed  to  have profits  (or
losses)  very closo  to zero.
19.  This assumption  will not hold if inflation  is high,  since  the
proceeds  of the inflation  tax  would  create  profits  for  the  central  bank that-10  -
in the  current  set-up  would implicitly  accrue  to the  private  sector. In the
basic  model,  this  problem  is  partially  solved  for  the  moment  by giving  the
user the  option  to hold the  government  nominal  interest  rate fixed  in
simulations  where inflation  increases,  which effectively  gives  the  government
the  proceeds  of the (additional)  inflation  tax.  In the  extended  model,  the
inflation  tax  is  separated  out  more  precisely  as  a  means  of  financing.
20.  The  model  keeps  track  of  financial  stocks  by  adding  each  period's
flow  to  last  period's  stock. The  dollar  foreign  reserves  and  debt  stocks  are
cumulated  over  time  by  adding  each  year's  flow  in  dollars,  then  converting  the
stock  to  pesos  by  multiplying  by  the  current  exchange  rate. This  procedure
will  take  into  account  the  revaluation  of  the  external  debt  in  peso  terms,  but
not  that  due  to  movements  of  the  dollar  vis-a-vis  other  foreign  currencies,
which  is  not  assumed  to  be  a  major  factor  in  the  projection.
21.  The  real  growth  rate  is  inputed  exogenously  into  the  model  as  an
assumption  of  the  users  in  the  basic  model. Having  real  economic  growtt
exogenous  is  a  major  simplification  that  allows  the  model  to  be  solved
recursively.  The  users  will  have  to  judge  what  growth  rate  is  appropriate
based  on  their  knowledge  of  supply  factors,  exogenous  demand  shocks,  etc. The
model  will  calculate  an  ICOR  to  judge  whether  the  growth  projection  is
reasonable  in  light  of  the  investment  rate. 6
22.  The  real  interest  rate,  the  real  exchange  rate,  and  the  inflation
rate  are  also  inputed  exogenously  into  the  model. This  can  be  interpreted  as
6/  In  the  extended  model  in  Part  II,  the  ICOR  will  be specified  on  the
basis  of  historical  data  and  the  growth  rate  calculated  endogenously.
We eschew  a  more  complicated  aggregate  supply  function  to  keep  the
model  tractable.a  11  -
setting  policy  targets  for  these  variables,  and  then solving  for  the requisite
private  or public  sector  behavior  to meet the  targets.
23.  Finally,  some  other  variables  are inputed  exogenously  into  the  model
because  their  projections  are  based  on  more detailed  information  than  can  be
captured  endogenously  by the  model.  These  include  nonfinancial  service  trade,
disbursements  of external  debt  by type (except  when calculated  as a residual
as  described  below),  direct  foreign  investment  flows,  and  population  growth.
C.  Residual  Variables:  A Tale of Two  Closures
24.  The  user  has two  options  as to  what will be the  residual  variable  in
the  national  accounts  identity  that  equates  the  current  account  balance  to the
excess  of incom over  expenditure  (or  equivalently  the  equation  that  total
saving--including  foreign--equal  total  investment).  These  two  options  will be
referred  to as  the 'private  closure'  and the 'fiscal  closure'. In the  private
closure,  the  private  sector  will be the  residual,  just  as in the  traditional
RMSM.  The behavioral  equation  for  private  consumption  will be overridden  by
the requirement  that  private  saving  and  consumption  balance  the  national
accounts  identity.  In the fiscal  closure,  the  public  sector  will be the
residual. Instead  of exogenously  projecting  public  investment,  it  will be the
residual  variable  that  balances  the  national  accounts  identity.
25.  There  are  other  residual  variables  that  are  chosen  in  a  manner
consistent  with  the  first  choice  between  private  consumption  or  government
investment  as  the  residual  as  shown  in  Diagram  I.  In  the  private  closure,
foreign  exchange  reserves  will  be  the  residual  for  the  balance  of  payments,
while  external  net  disbursements  are  determined  *eogenously.  In  the  fiscal- 12 -
closure,  the  change in foreign  exchange  reserves  is  determined  as that
necessary  to  meet a target  ratio  to imports.  while  net loans  to the public
sector  vill be the balance  of payments  residual. In both  cases, the  current
account  deficit  of the  balance  of payments  is  determined  by the export  and
import  behavior  as a function  of the real  exchange  rate  and the relevant
activity  variables.  This  must be consistent  vith the  excess  of expenditure
over income  or investment  over saving.
Diasram  I
Private  and Fiscal  Closures
Residual  Variable  ins
National
Accounts  Balance  Monetary
Closure:  Identity  of Payments  Identity  Other
Private  Private  Change in  Credit  to  Private  credit  to
Consumption  Foreign  Private  govt. is residual
Exchange  Sector 7 for  government
Reserves  financing
Fiscal  Public  Change  in  Credit  to  Net  short-term
Investment  Public  Public  Sector  foreign  capital
Foreign  flow is residu%l
Debt  for  private
sector  capital
account
26.  The  residual  for  the  flows  of  the  banking  system  is also  determined
in a manner  consistent  vith the  closure.  In the  private  closure,  the residual
variable  to balance  sources  and  uses for the  banking  system is  credit to the
private  sector.  In the fiscal  closure,  it is  credit  to the public sector  that
is  the  residual  variable.  In this latter  closure,  for  example,  money and
quasi-money  demands  (and  other  asset  demands)  are  determined  as functions  of
7/  It  would  also  be possible  to  make  credit  to the  public sector  the
residual  in  this  case,  which  would  be  more  consistent  with lK-style
financial  programing.- 13 -
the  real  interest  rate  and  inflation,  private  sector  credit  demand  is
determined  as  a ratio  to  private  investment,  and  credit  to  the  public  sector
is  the  residual.
27.  Finally,  there  will  be  two  other  variables  that  are  calculated
differently  under  the  two  closures.  Under  the  private  sector  closure,  net
private  short-term  foreign  capital  flows  are  projected  exogenously,  while
under  the  fiscal  closure  they  are  the  residual  for  the  private  sector  capital
account.  Correspondingly,  the  change  in private  sector  holdings  of government
debt are the residual  for  the  public  sector  capital  account  under  the  private
closure,  while they  are  determined  as a fixed  ratio  to quasi-money  in the
fiscal  closure.
28.  Depending  on  the  closure,  the  mods]  ansvers  two  potential  hypothe-
tical  questions.  Under  the  residual  private  sector  option,  the  projection
answers  the  question  'what  level  of  private  consumption  (and  saving)  is
consistent  with  given  targets  for  the  real  exchange  rate,  the  real  interest
rate,  and  inflation?'  Under  the  residual  public  sector  option,  the  model
answers  the  question  'what  level  of  public  investment  (and  public  deficit)  is
consistent  with  these  targets?'  In  most  cases,  the  derived  levels  will  need
to  be  evaluated  and  if  found  unreasonable,  the  model  will  have  to  be  solved
again  until  reasonable  values  are  obtained.
29.  The  user  will  have  to  decide  which  closure  is  more  appropriate  to
particular  circumstances.  The  private  sector  closure  has  the  advantage  that
the  budget  variables  can  be  exogenously  projected  in  accordance  with  stated
government  intentions.  The  disadvantage  is  that  there  is  no  way  to  evaluate
within  the  model  hov  or  why  the  required  change  ln  private  saving  is  going  to- 14 -
occur.  The fiscal  closure  has the  advantage  that  the  private  sector  is
assumed  to conform  to  well-established  behavioral  rules. The nodel  can chen
give the  required  government  deficit  to attain  the desired  targets,  which  can
be used as a guide  to government  budget  policy.  Since  the  public  sector
closure  has a more transparent  economic  interpretaticn,  it  will be the  one
used in the  main text  of this  paper.  The results  of the  private  sector
closure  will be presented  in  Appendix  I: for  comparison.
D.  The  economics  of the fiscal  closure
30.  It is  difficult  in this  model,  with its  complicated  accounting  and
its  residual  closure  rules,  to visualize  the underlying  economic  structure.
Since  the  economic  structure  is simpler  than the solution  methods,  it  would  be
useful  to keep it in  mind during  the subsequent  discussion  of the simulations.
In this section,  we su"arize the  economic  intuition  underlying  the  model  with
a core  model that  glosses  over the accounting  details  to focus  on the
relationship  between  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  and the 'target'  variables-
-the real  exchange  rate,  real interest  rate,  and inflation  rate.  We first
discuss  how these  variables  would  be determined  endogenously,  and then  how
targets  for these  variables  could  be achieved. This  will serve  as an economic
justification  for  the 'fiscal  closure'  cited  earlier.
31.  There  are  three  basic  relations  in the  core  model.  The first
relation  is  the condition  for  equilibrium  in the  goods  market,  which requires
the  current  account  deficit,  as given  by net imports  and debt interest,  to  be
equal to investment  less  national  savings- 1S  -
(1)  M(s) - X(;)  * I)  + Ig - Sp  Sg
where  M and  X are  import  and  export  functions  of  the  real  exchange  rate  e (up
is  appreciation),  Ip  is  private  investment  as  a function  of  real  interest  rate
r,  Ig  is  government  investment,  Sp  and  Sg  are  private  and  government  dome-tic
saving  respectively.
32.  The  signs  given  are  those  of  the  function  with  respect  to  the
arguments.  We  assume  that  the  economy  produces  a  domestic  good,  which  is  an
imperfect  substitute  for  international  goods,  and  an  export  good. The  real
exchange  rate  P/E (with  P the  domestic  price,  E the exchange  rate,  and the
price  of  foreign  good  -1) is  the  relative  price  of  the  domestic  good  with
respect  to  the  foreign  good. Thus  imports  are  a  positive  function  and  exports
a  negative  function  of  this  relative  price.  Equation  (1)  implies  an  inverse
relation  betveen  a  and  r  to  maintain  equilibrium  in  the  goods  market.  A  real
depreciation  (decrease  in  e)  creates  excess  demand  for  domestic  goods  which
must  be  offset  by  a rise  in  the  real  irterest  rate  to  lower  private  investment
expenditure.  The  real  exchange  rate  e  could  vary  either  because  of  a  change
in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  E  or in  domestic  prices  P. Since  domestic  prices
will  be  determined  below,  the  nominal  exchange  rate  should  be  thought  of  as
the  endogenous  variable.  Colombia  follows  a  crawling  peg  where  the  reaction
function  of  the  authorities  is  flexible  enough  to  accomodate  shifts  in  macro
fundamentals  such  as  those  represented  by  this  model.
33.  The  other  two  relations  are  for  equilibrium  in  two  of  the  three  asset
sgrkets.  The  thrie  assets  in  the  core  model  are  high-powered  money,  domestic
debt,  and  foreign  debt. We look  at  the  equilibrium  conditions  for  money  and- 16 -
domestic  debt.  High-powered money is the liability  of the  central  bank,
which  must be equal  to central  bank assets:
(2)  DCg +  E*R*  - h-PQH(r,J) + POHp(i)
34.  Central  bank assets  include  credit  to the  government  DCg and foreign
reserves  EGR*.  Central  bank liabilities  include  reserves  against  the  nominal
value  of quasi-money  (POQM)  at  the reserve  ratio  h and  nominal  currency
holdings  POHPI  Real quasimoney  QM is a positive  function  of the real  interest
rate r and a  negative  function  of the inflation  rate  v.  The latter  effect  is
because  r is the real loan  rate,  so that a  higher  inflation  rate for  a given  r
implies  a lower  real  deposit  rate  through  the implicit  tax from  the reserve
requirement. Real currency  demand  p is  a  negative  function  of inflation.
35.  Equilibrium  in the  money  market  implies  a  negative  relation  between
interest  rates  and inflation. The inflation  rate is  the  change  in P and
expectations  are  stetic,  so that  higher  P means  higher  X.  The  value  of
nominal  currency  holdings  P*H,(F)  will decrease  with a fall  in P (and  r) as
long as  we  have not passed  the  maximum  point  of the inflation  tax  Laffer
curve.  For a given  stock  of domestic  credit  to the  government  (DC.)  and
international  reserves  R*, the real  interest  rate  must rise to  maintain
equilibrium  in the  demand  for  high-powered  money  by raising  demand  for  bank
reserves  against  quasi-money.
36.  The  equilibrium  in the  debt  market  is  for  holdings  of quasi-money
(les  reserve  requirements)  to equal  public  (LS)  and  private (Lp)  credit  from
the  rest  of the  banking  system:- 17  -
(3)  (l-h)*QM(r,f) - Lp(r) +  Lg
37.  As already  mentioned,  quasimoney  is a positive  function  of the  real
interest  rate  r and  a negative  function  of the inflation  rate.  Private  credit
is a negativd  function  of the  real loan  interest  rate  r.  This implies  a
positive  relation  between  the  real  loan  rate  and  the  inflation  rate  to
equilibrate  the  debt  market. An increase  in inflation  will lower  quasimoney
demand,  which  will require  an increase  in the  real loan  rate  to  maintain
equilibrium  in the  credit  market.
38.  These  three  relationships  will determine  the  endogenous  variables  r,
e, and  I  for  values  of the  exogenous  policy  variables  Ig,  DCg.,  and  Lg.
Government  foreign  borrowing  and  private  external  capital  flows  are  implicitly
determined  as  a residual,  since  by  Walras'  law  the  market  in  foreign  assets
must  clear  once  the  other  markets  clear.  Diagram  11  shows  diagrammatically
the  determination  of  equilibrium  at  point  A.  The  first  quadrant  shows  the
money  and  debt  equilibria  (equations  2  and  3),  which  determine  jointly  the
inflation  rate  and  the  real  interest  rate. The  real  interest  rate  determines
private  investment.  Since  public  investment,  private  saving,  and  public
saving  are  insensitive  to  the  real  interest  rate,  this  determines  the
investment-saving  gap,  i.e.  the  current  account  deficit.  This  in  turn
determines  the  rzal  exchange  rate  that  yields  export  and  import  behavior
consistent  with  that  current  account  deficit  (equation  1)  as  shown  in  quadrant
2  of  diagram  II.
39.  Comparative  statics  with  this  simple  model  can  give  some  insight  into
the  economic  intuition  behind  the  functioning  of  the  larger  macro  model. An
increase  in  monetary  financing  (rise  in  DCg)  will  shift  out  the  money- 18  -
equilibrium  curve  in diagram  II,  moving  the  equilibrium  from  A to  B. Higher
money  creation  increases  inflation,  as we would  expect  from standard
monetarist  models.  It also increases  the  real loan  interest  rate slightly.
This is because  the  higher  inflation  causes  a drop in the real  deposit  rate
because  of the increased  inflation  tax  through  the  reserve  requirement,  which
requires  a  higher  real  loan  interest  rate  to  maintain  equilibrium  in  the
credit  market. The  increase  in  the  interest  rate  discourages  private
investment,  shrinking  the  current  account  deficit.  This  implies  a real
depreciation,  as  shown  by  point  B in  quadrant  2  of  diagram  II. Since  the
government  deficit  (Ig  Sg)  is  unchanged,  the  outcome  is  a substitution  of
money  financing  of  the  deficit  for  external  financing.
40.  The  second  comparative  static  exercise  is  an  increase  in  domestic
debt  financing  of  the  deficit  (higher  L.). This  shifts  up  the  debt
equilibrium,  increasing  the  real  loan  interest  rate  and  lowering  inflation
(point  C in  quadrant  1  of  diagram  II). The  higher  interest  rate  leads  to  a
smaller  curr 't  account  deficit  and real  exchange  rate  depreciation. The
outcome  this Lime is  a substitution  of domestic  public  debt for foreign  public
debt.
41.  This  model is implicit  in the simulations  to be presented  in the  rest
of  the  paper. However,  in  those  simulations  we  will  specify  targets  for  the
endogenous  variables  t.  r,  and  e,  and  solve  for  the  policy  variables  1g,  DCg,
and  L.  as  residuals.  Thus  we  are  inverting  the  equations  (1),  (2),  and  (3),
but  the  economics  is  the  same.DIAGRAM  II:  Determination of real exchange rate, real Interest rate,  and Inflation rate
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III.  HOW THE  MODEL  WORKS:  ILLUSTRATIVE  CASES
42.  The functioning  of the  model  can  be illustrated  by simulations  in
which  we change  the  key target  variables--the  real  exchange  rate,  the real
interest  rate,  and the  inflation  rate.  The  model  under  the fiscal  closure
solves  for  the 'financeable'  fiscal  deficit  given  the  values  of the target
variables,  as shown  in  Diagram  II.  It adjusts  the level  of public  investment
so as to  make the 'above  the line'  fiscal  deficit  equal  the  available
financing.
43.  We first  solve  the  model for  the  base case in  which the  target
variables  are roughly  unchanged  from  the  base year,  as shown  in Table  2.  This
solution  is intended  to be an illustration  rather  than the  most likely
scenario.  We then consider  three  simulations,  each corresponding  to an
increase  in one  of the  target  variables. All three  simulations  increase  the
financeable  fiscal  deficit,  but they  do so in  different  ways. 9 It should  be
noted  that in  all simulations  the  GDP growth  rate is  kept unchanged  to
dramatize  the impact  of alternative  target  variables  on the size  and
composition  of the financeable  fiscal  deficit. Thus  the  variables  to
8/  This base  case  (using  the  basic  model)  was  run  before  recent
developmnts in Colombia  changed  the  outlook  drastically. It differs
from the  base case in Part II (using  the  extended  model),  which  was run
subsequently.  Although  an attempt  was  made to have a plausible  case,  it
should  be re-emphasized  that it is for  illustration  only.
9/  For simplicity,  tho  model exaggerates  the  separability  of the  effects
of changes  in the three  target  variables. In a more complex  model,  we
would take account  of interrelationships  such as  the  *ifect  of
devaluation  on demand  for  quasi-money  or on private  investment.- 21 -
concentrate  on in these  simulations  are  public  investment,  public  savings,  the
sources  (internal  and  external)  of financing  of the  public  deficit,  and the
internal  mechanism  leading  to the  observed  changes  rather  than  the impact  of
the observed  changes  on growth. In all  simulations  in this and  the succeeding
section,  it should  be kept in  mind that  the results  depend  on the  parameter
values  for  the  behavioral  functions,  the  estimation  of  which is described  on
the  appendix.
A.  Real  Exchange  Rate  Appreciation
44.  First  we solve  the  model  for  a  case  in  which  the  real  exchange  rate
appreciates  by  1.8  percent  per  year,  but  inflation  and  the  real  interest  rate
(as  well  as  all  other  exogenous  variables)  are  unchanged.  Table  3  presents
the  difference  in  each  variable  between  the  exchange  rate  appreciation  case
and  the  base  case.
45.  The  moct  dramatic  change  is  an  increase  in  the  current  account
deficit  of the  balance  of payments,  which  by the  end  of the  simulation  period
is 1.3  percentage  points  of GDP  higher. This is a consequence  of the  behavior
of imports,  which increase  in volume,  and  exports,  which fall  in volume  due  to
the  real  exchange  rate  appreciation.  Both  Imports  and  exports  fall  as  a ratio
to GDP because  of valuation  effects,  but exports  fall  much more (in  a Oreal.
life'  situation  this  effect  would  not  be  as  large  since  GDP  might  well
increase  due  to  greater  public  investment).  The  current  account  worsens  even
more  because  of  the  increase  in  public  investment,  since  public  sector  imports
of  capital  goods  increase  proportionately.- Z2  -
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TABLE  3
SIMULATION  DIFFERENCES  FROM  BASE  CASE
FISCAL  CLOSURE
EXCHANGE  RATE APPREC:AT:;N
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  :35
GDP  Growth  Rate  0.00%  0.00%  0.005  0.00%  0.o  8  .. 0
Investment  Growth  Rate  1.48%  1.54%  1.58%  0.851  123:  0 92%
Private  0.00%  0.001  0.005  0.00%  0%  0  0.QC
Public  5.05%  5.21%  5.75%  0.51%  2.351  1.501
GOP per  capita  Growth  Rate  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.001%  O.GC
Consumption  per  capita  growth  rate  -0.09%  -0.12%  -0.111  -0.00%  -0.02%  0.011
Groat  Investment/GOP  0.21%  0.44%  0.87%  0.80%  0.95X  1.07%
Domestic  Savings/GDP  -0.01%  -0.02%  -0.04X  -0.0  %  -0.08%  -0.10%
National  Savings/COP  0.03%  0.031  0.01X  -0.04%  -0.11%  -0.20%
Marginal  National  Savings  Rate  3.86%  3.69%  3.19%  0.12%  -0.05X  -1.27%
Private  Invostment/GDP  -0.05%  -0.09%  -0.14%  -0.18%  -O.23%  -0.27%
Private  Consumption/GOP  0.011  0.02%  0.04%  0,06%  0.08  0.10%
Privato  Savings/GOP  0.0oX  0.02%  0.03%  0.06%  0.07%  0.10%
Privato  Resource  Balance/GOP  0.0C1  0.11  0.17%  0.23%  0.30%  0.37%
Public  Invostment/GDP  0.26%  0.53X  0.81%  0.99%  1.18X  1.34%
Public  Savings/GOP  0.03X  0.02X  -0.02%  -0.09X  -0.19%  -0.30%
Public  Revenues/GDP  -0.03%  -0.06%  -0.09%  -0.12%  -0.15X  -0.18%
Public  Expenditures/GDP  0.19%  0.48%  0.73%  0.951  1_1:  1.  4e
Public  Deficit/GDP  0.23%  0.52%  0.83%  1.08%  1.37%  1.'4%
MLT  External  Financing  0.1O  1  0.44%  0.72%  0.93X  1.19%  1.44%
ST External  Financing  0.00%  0.001  0.00%  0.00  0.005  0.00%
Domestic  financing-financial  system  0.061  0.081  0.111  0.161  0.17%  0.21%
Domestic  financing-privato  sector  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Rocidual  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0,001  0.001
Roal  exchange  rote  index  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.11
Roal  Exchange  Rate  Depreciation(-)  1.801  1.601  1.80%  1.80%  1.80%  1.80%
Domestic  Inflation  0.00%  0.001  0.00%  O.OOX  0.00%  0.00%
Exchange  Rate  Depreciation  -2.08%  -2.04X  -2.04%  -2.04X  -2.04%  -2.04%
Nominal  Intorest  Rate  0.00%  0.00%  0.00s  0.00%  O CC%  *  0cC
Real  Interest  Rate  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  OCC%  0.01
Covernment  Interost  Rate  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.001  0.00  OC.0  0.00%
Stock  of  Wi/GDP  0.00  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.001  0.00%
Stock  of  Quasi-ooney/GOP  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.001  0.00%  0.00%
Stock  of credit  to private  sector/GDP  -0.12%  -0.23X  -0.36X  -0.46%  -0.57%  -0.87%
Export  Crowth  Rate  -0.391  -0.36%  -0.34%  -0.39X  -0.36%  -0.37%
Growth  rate  manufacturing  exports  -1.42X  -1.42X  -1.42%  -1.42X  -1.42%  -1.42%
Exports/GOP  -0.37%  -0.76X  -1.13X  -1.43X  -1.75%  -2.04%
Import  Crowth  Rate  0.921  0.93X  0.93%  0.99%  0.90%  0.89%
Growth  rate intermediate  imports  0.411  0.41X  0.41%  0.411  0.41%  0.41%
Growth  rate  private  capital  imports  0.92%  0.92%  0.92%  0.92%  0.92%  0.92%
Crowth  rate  private  cons  imports  1.82%  1.82%  1.82%  1.83%  1.83%  1.84%
Importd/cOP  -0.161  -0.231  -0.42%  -0.57%  -0.72%  -0.87%
Current  Account  Deficit  (in  USImillion)  93  216  376  672  812  1110
Current  Account  Deficit/GOP  0.18%  0.41X  0.61  0.86%  1.071  1.28%
Net  International  Reserves  (USimillion)  39  87  144  211  291  384
Net  Reservoe  (in  months  Imports)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Total  External  Debt  Ratio  -0.441  -0.541  -0.311  0.16%  0.88%  1.80%
Public  Debt  Ratio  -0.321  -0.291%  0.07%  0.68%  1.52%  2.56%_ 25 -
46.  The real  exchange  rate  appreciation  initially  improves  the  external
debt ratio  to GDP because  of the  valLition  effect.  Hovever,  as the  current
account  deficit  videns the debt  ratio  worsens,  until  by the  end of the period
the  debt ratio  is  above that  in the base  case.  The public  debt ratio
(including  both internal  and  external  public  debt)  behaves  in an analogous
fashion.
47.  The increase  in  public  investment  occurs  because  the real  exchange
rate  appreciation  increases  the financing  available  to the  public  sector
(i.e.,  the simulation  assumes  that  additional  external  financing  is in fact
available). 10 Externsl  loans  to the  public  sector  increase  due to the rise
in the  current  account  deficit  and  higher  foreign  reserve  accumulation.
Foreign  exchange  reserves  must rise  to  meet the target  of a  given ratio  of
reserves  to imports.  Since  net disbursements  to the public aector  are the
residual  for the  balance  of payments,  they  must rise  to cover  both  the higher
current  account  deficit  and  the higher  reserve*.  The  economic  reasoning  is
that  a target  of real  exchange  appreciation  requires  a higher,  externally-
financed  public  deficit  to be consistent  with the absorption  of a higher  net
inflov  of tradeable  goods.  Since  public investment  is the residual  for  the
Oabove  the line'  public  sector  accounts,  the  higher fiscal  deficit  requires  a
higher  level  of public  investment.
48.  The real  exchange  rate  appreciation  also  decreases  public  saving  by
the  end of the  period,  largely  because  of interest  costs  on the  higher public
external  debt  due to larger  deficits. The real  exchange  rate  change  also
affects  the valuation  of dollar  incom  and expenditure  by the  public  sector,
10/ If  additional  external  financing  is  not forthconirg,  then the real
exchange  rate  must adjust  endogenously  Lnstead  of boing  targetted.
This is  pursued in  part 11  of the  paper.- 26
but  these  effects  roughly  offset  each  other.  The decline  in public  savirg
restrains  slightly  the increase  in  public  investment.
49.  Private  saving  and investment  are  also  affected  by the real  exchange
rate  appreciation. Private  saving  increases  slightly  because  of the  rise in
private  disposable  income. This in turn is due  to the  fall in the real  value
of three  private  expenditures  that  are subtracted  when calculating  disposable
income:  trade  taxes  on private  sector  imports,  private  external  interest
payments,  and  remittances  of  profits  on  foreign  direct  investment.  Private
investment  falls  as  a ratio  to  GDP  because  the  ratio  of  the  investment
deflator  to  the  general  GDP  deflator  falls  due  to  the  high  import  component  of
private  investment.  The  real  volume  of  private  investment  is  unchanged
because  both  the  real  interest  rate  and  GDP  growth  are  assumed  to  be  unchanged
in  the  simulation.
50.  Lower  private  investment  decreases  the  private  sector's  net
r?quirements  from  the  banking  system,  so  that  domestic  credit  to  the  public
sector  can increase. This  contributes  also to the  increase  in the financeable
public  sector  deficit.  The  higher  private  saving  also  lowers  the  inflow  of
external  short-term  capital  to  the  private  sector,  which  permits  higher
external  finance  to  the  public  sector.
51.  To  sum  up,  an  accumulated  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  of  11
percent  over  1990-95  permits  a  higher  public  sector  deficit  by  1.6  percentage
points  of  GDP  by  1995.11  Of  this,  1.4  percentage  points  is  financed  from
I/ This  simulation  shows  how a  higher  fiscal  deficit  would  lead  to
appreciation  if  we  were  to  reverse  the  causality  --  i.e.  fix  the
deficit  and  its  financing  and  determine  the  "target"  variables
endogenously.- 27  -
external  sources  and .2  points  from  internal  sources.  Since  public  saving
falls  by 0.3  percentage  points  due  to higher  interest  costs,  public  inves:rent
can  only increase  by 1.3  percentage  points  of GDP.
B.  Higher  Real Interest  Rate
52.  The  next  simulation  involves  an  increase  in  the  real  interest  rate  by
7.3  percentage  points  beginning  in  1990  and  continuing  through  1995. The
government  interest  rate  increases  commensurately.  Inflation  and  the  real
exchange  rate  are  unchanged.  The  differences  between  this  simulation  and  the
base  case  are  shown  in  Table  4.
53.  The  public  deficit  increases  by  1.3  percentage  points  of  GDP  by  1991
and  stays  at  about  that  level  through  1995. The  increase  is  mostly  due  to  an
increase  in  the  available  internal  financing,  with  the  majority  of  this  coming
from  the  banking  system.
54.  The  higher  real  interest  rate  induces  higher  holdings  of  quasi-money,
which  causes  a strong  one-time  pc-tfolio  shift  away  from  foreign  assets  in
1990. After  1990,  there  is  a  sustained  higher  level  of  quasi-money
accumulation  as  the  private  sector  maintains  the  new  higher  ratio  of  quasi-
money  to  GDP.  The  counterpart  to  the  one-time  shift  to  quasi-money  is  a
pril;..te  capital  inflow  from  abroad,  which  represents  a  reduction  in  the  net
holdings  of foreign  assets. There is  no effect  on  money demand,  because  this
is  assumed  to  be  a  pure  transactions  demand  dependent  only  on  the  rate  of
inflation,  which  is  supported  by  econometric  evidence.- 23  -
TABLE  4
SIMULATION  DIFFERENCES  FROM  BASE  CASE
FISCAL  CLOSURE
H2IH  INTEREST  RATE
- 1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
CDP Growth  Rate  0.00%  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.001
Invostment  Crowth  Rate  -2.53X  1.43%  -0.46%  -0.30X  -0.24%  -0.23%
Private  -3.56s  0.00%  0.00%  0.00o  0.001  0.00o
Public  -0.01%  4.82%  -1.0oe  -2.211  -0.971  -0,92%
COP per  capita  Crowth  Rate  0.00  0.00%  0.00  0.00%  0.00  0.OC
Consumption por capita  growth  rate  0.52%  -0.32%  0.09%  0.08%  0.0oe  0.o0%
Gross  Investment/GOP  -0.48%  -0.19%  -0.27%  -0.34%  -0.39%  -0.45%
Domestic  Savings/GOP  -0.40X  -0.161  -0.23%  -0.28%  -0.33X  -0.37%
National  Savings/GOP  -0.40%  -0.1X  -0.18X  -0.24X  -0.29%  -0.33%
Marginal  National  Savings  Rate  -10.34X  17.38%  -2.39%  -3.09%  -2.76%  -2.39X
Privuto  Investment/GOP  -0.48X  -0.48%  -0.486  -0.48%  -0.48%  -0.48X
Private  Consumption/GOP  0.40%  0.16  0.23%  0.23%  0.33%  0.37%
Private  Swings/COP  0.07%  0.96%  0.961  02:7%  0.961  0.99%
Private  Resource  Ialane*/CDP  0.651  1.44X  1.44X  1.45X  1.46X  1.47X
Public  Investment/COP  -0.001  0.29!  0.21%  0.14%  0.091  0.03!
Public  Savings/GOP  -0.471  -1.10%  -1.14%  -1.22X  -1.29%  -1.32X
Public  Revenue*/GOP  -0.01%  -0.011  -0.011  -0.01%  -0.01%  -0.01%
Public  Expenditures/GOP  0.46%  1.3SX  1.34%  1.34!  1.36X  1.34X
Public Deficit/CDP  0.47%  1.391  1.35%  1.35%  1.381  1.361
MLT  External  Financing  -4.87X  0.30X  0.22X  0.22%  0.23%  0.23X
ST External  Financing  . 0.0  0.001  0,00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Domestic  financing-financial  system  6.151  1.0SX  1.09%  1.09%  1.09%  1.091
Domestic  financing-privato  sector  0.19%  0.04X  0.041  0.04%  0.041  0.04X
Rs  idual  O.001  0.001  0.00%  0.001  0.001  0.001
Real  exchange  rato index  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Real  Exchange  Rate  Depreciation(-)  0.001  0.00%  0.00!  0.001  0.00%  0.00%
Dooestic  Inflation  0.00%  0.001  0.00  0  0.001  0.00  0.001
Exchange  Rate  Depreciation  0.00x  0.001  0.001  0.00%  0.001  0.001
Nominal  Interest  Rate  8.99X  8.92%  6.92%  8.92X  8.92X  8.92%
Real  rnterest  Rate  7.31%  7.31%  7.31%  7.31%  7.31X  7.31X
Government  Interost  Rote  8.41%  8.34X  8.34%  8.341  8.34X  8.34X
Stock  of Wi/GOP  0.00%  0.00!  0.001  0.00!  0.00%  0.001
Stock  of Quasi-money/GOP  2.29!  2.29X  2.29%  2.291  2.29%  2.29%
Stock  of crodit  to private  sector/CDP  -1.20X  -1.20%  -1.20X  -1.20%  -1.20%  -1.20X
Export  Growth  Rate  0.00%  0.00%  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.00!
Growth rate  manufacturing  exports  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.001
Exports/GDP  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.001  0.001  0.00%
Import  Growth  Rate  -0.655  0.32%  -0.091  -0.08%  -0.04!  -0.06%
Growth  rate  Intermediate  imports  0.0011  0.00  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.001
Growth rate  private  capital  imports  -3.61%  0.00%  0.00!  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Growth  rate  private  cons imports  0.59X  -0.36X  0.10%  0.09%  0.061  0.07%
Imports/GOP  -0.08X  -0.03X  -0.06%  -0.06%  -0.07%  -0.081
Curront  Account  Deficit  (in  USimillbon)  -38  -22  -61  -C0  -86  -84
Current  Account  Deficit/CDP  -0.06%  -0.041  -0.09%  -0.10%  -0.10%  -0.121
Net International  Resorves  (USIsmlIion)  -23  -10  -16  -22  -29  -34
Net Reserves  (in  sonthi  imports)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Totel  External  Debt  Ratio  -4.87X  -4.141  -3.651  -3.01!  -2.611  -2.061
Public  DObt  Ratio  0.47%  1.161  1.761  2.30%  2.81%  3.26%- 29 -
5.  The  higher  real interest  rate  also  leads  to a drop in private
ressment,  wh4ch  reduces  the  private  sector  demand  for  credit  from the
banking  system  (assumed  to  be proportional  to investment). The combination  of
increased  private  financial  saving  and lower  credit  demand  allows  an expansion
in  credit  to the  public  sector. The  effect  is  very strong  the first  year
because  of the one-time  portfoli.  shift,  then the  increased  financing  becomes
more modest  as financial  stocks  settle  at  their  new long-run  ratios  to GDP.
The one-time  foreign  capital  inflow  to the  private  sector  also reduces  sharply
external  financing  to the  public  sector  the  first  year.  Since  the  capital  flow
to the public  sector  is the residual  for  the  balance  of payments,  an increased
capital  flow  to the  private  sector  and a  roughly  unchanged  current  account
deficit  imply  the  government  must reduce  sharply  its  net external  borrowing.
56.  The increase  in  the financeable  public  deficit  does  not translate
fully  into  an  increase  in public  investment. The increase  in the  interest
rate translates  immediately  into  higher  interest  costs  on the  domestic
government  debt.  Although  there  is  an offsetting  effect  as the  government
external  debt is reduced,  the  net  change  in total  interest  costs  is still
strongly  positive  because  domestic  interest  rates  are  higher  than foreign
ones.  This  effect  grows  stronger  over time  as  more government  internal  debt
is accumulated  through  the  higher  deficits. Thus,  the level  of public
investment  increases  only .3  percentage  points  of  GDP in 1991,  even though  the
deficit  increases  by 1.4  percentage  points.  By  1995,  higher  interest  costs  are
absorbing  all of the increased  financing  and  the increase  in public  investment
is practically  nil.  This  is the  outcome  of an  internal  debt  spiral  since  the
real interest  rate (10)  greatly  exceeds  the  growth  rate  4?).- 30
57.  Private  saving  increases  as  a result  of the  higher  real  interest
rates. This  is  not  because  of  any  interest  elasticity  of saving. Private
disposable  income  increases  because  of the  higher  interest  earnings  on
holdings  of  government  debt,  which  more  than  offset  diminished  earnings  on  net
private  foreign  assets  because  of the  higher  domestic  interest  rate.
58.  The  current  account  deficit  Is  marginally  reduced  because  of  the
reduction  in  total  investment,  as the  reduction  in  private  investment  more
than  offsets  the  increase  in  public  investmnt. The  lower  investment  causes
lover  imports  of  capital  goods  for  a  given  real  exchange  rate.
59.  In summary,  increasing  the  real  interest  rate  raises  the  financeable
public  deficit  by 1.4  percentage  points  of  GDP  by  1991  due  to  a one-time
portfolio  shift. However,  the  high  real  domestic  interest  rate  leads  to  a
debt  spiral  that  results  ln  most  of  the  new  financLng  bolng  used  to  pay  the
additional  interest  by tho  end  of the  period,  rather  than  finding  its  way  into
increased  public  investment.
C. Increase  in  Inflation
60.  Table 5  shows the  effects  of an increase  in the inflation  rate  by 6
percentago  points,  from  22t  to  282,  beginning  in  1990. The  real  exchange  rate
and  the  real  interest  rate  are  unchanged,  so  that  the  nominal  interest  rate
and  the  nominal  exchange  rate  increase  to  match  the  higher  inflation.
However,  the  nominal  government  interest  rate  is  assumed  to  remain  unchanged)1 2
12/  As noted  earlier,  the  fixed  nominal  government  interest  rate  allows  the
government  to  use  the  inflation  tax  (as  opposed  to  debt  finance)  as  a
means  to  finance  the  deficit.- 31  -
TASLE  5
SIWULATION  DIFFERENCES  FROM  BASE  CASE
FISCAL  CLOSURE
HICH INFLATION
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
COP Growth  Rat.  -0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  -0.00%  -0.005  -O :C1
Investmont Growth  Rate  1.34%  0.34%  0.19X  0.03%  0.02%  002%
Private  0.00X  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.  00
Public  4.865  1.41X  0.97%  -0.92X  -0.17X  -0.191
COP  per capita Crowth  Rate  -0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  -0.00%  -0.00%  -0.001
Consumption por capita  growth rate  -0.28X  -0.0ox  -0.04X  -0.03%  -0.011  -0.011
Cross  Invostment/CDP  0.26e  0.32X  0.36X  0.37%  0.38%  0.39%
Domestic Savings/COP  0.21X  0.26x  0.29X  0.31X  0.31X  0.321 Notional  Savings/GOP  0.21X  0.26X  0.27%  0.29%  0.29X  0.291
Marginal National Savings Rate  5.60%  1.51X  1.161  0.99%  o.811  0.63%
Private  Investment/CDP  0.00  0.00%1  O.OX  0.00%  0.00%  0.001
Private Consumption/GDP  -0.21X  -0.26X  -0.29X  -0.311  -0.31X  -0.32X
Private Savings/GOP  0.171  0.21%  0.23X  0.25X  0.26X  0.271
Private Resource  Balance/COP  0.17X  0.21X  0.23X  0.265  0.26x  0.27%
Public Invostment/GDP  0.26X  0.32X  0.36X  0.37X  0.38X  0.39X
Public  Savings/GOP  0.04X  0.04X  0.04X  0.04X  0.03X  0.021
Public  Revonues/GDP  -0.001  -0.00%  -0.001  -0.001  -O.OOX  -0.00
Public Expen;iturss/CDP  0.22X  0.27X  0.31X  0.33X  0.35%  0.37%
Public Deficit/CDP  0.22%  0.27%  0.31X  0.34%  0.35X  0.37X
MLT External  Financing  0.01%  -0.09X  -0.08X  -0.05%  -0.03X  -0.01X ST  Extornal  Financing  0.00%  0.001  0.001  O.OOX  0.00%  0.001
Domeottc financing-financial  system  O.161  0.301  0.32X  0.32X  0.32%  0.32X
Domeetic financing-privat. sector  0.061  O.O6  0.O0C  0.06x  o.o06  0.061 Residual  O.GD1  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
Real  axchange  rate  index  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Real  Exchange  Rate  Depreciation(-)  0.001  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  000%  0.00I
Domestic Inflation  5.OOX  6.001  6.oo0  6.001%  6.oo0  6.00
Exchange  Rate  Depreciation  4.74X  5.691  6.691  e.691  5.691%  s.9%
Nominal  Interest  Rate  5.131  6.161  6.16%  6.161  6.161  e.181 Real  Interest  Rats  0.001  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.00°  0.00%
Covernment  Interest  Rate  -0.00%  -0.00%  -O.OOX  -0.OX  -0.00%  -0.00O
Stock of Mi/CDP  -0.111  -0.131  -0.13X  -0.13%  -0.13%  -0.131 Stock  of Quasi-money/COP  -0.001  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  -0.00%  -0.00% Stock  of  credit  to  private  sector/COP  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Export  Crowth  Rat.  0.001  0.001  O.OOX  -O.0WX  0.00%  0.00% Crowth  rate  manufacturing  exports  0.001  0.001  O.OOX  0.00%  O.00  0.00%
Exports/CDP  0.00%  0.001  0.001%  O.00  0.00%  0.00%
Import  Crowth  Rate  0.29X  0.07%  0.041  0.021  0.01  0.011% Crowth  rats  intermediate  imports  0.001  0.00%  O.001  O.00  0.00%  0.00% Growth  rate  private  capital  imports  0.00%  0.001  0.00%  O.0X  0.00%  0.00%
Growth  rate private cons imports  -0.321  -o.o7x  -0.04X  -0.03X  -0.01  -0.02%
Imports/GOP  0.041  0.06%  0.061  o.oex  0.07%  0.07%
Current Account Deficit  (in  USSmillion)  20  30  39  49  60  72
Current Account Deficit/COP  0.04X  0.061  0.071  0.08%  0.09%  0.10%
Net Intornational Reserves  (US3million)  12  17  20  24  27  30 Net  Roservoe  (in  months  imports)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Total  External  Debt  Ratio  0.01%  -0.09%  -0.16X  -0.19%  -0.201  -0.20% Public  Debt  RaFio  0.01%  0.02%  0.04%  0.07X  0.11%  0.161- 32 -
This means that the inflation tax on the public internal debt wi.' accr_e  ts
the government,  which has  an important  effect  on the  solution.
61.  The simulation  increases  the  financeable  public  deficit  by .4
percentage  points  of GDP  by 1995.  This comes  from  the increased  nominal  money
and quasi-money  accumulation  by the  private  sector  to keep up  with the  higher
inflation. There  is a decline  in the ratio  of  money balances  to GDP, but this
is more than  offset  by the  increased  inflation  as  we are still  on the  left-
hand side  of the inflation  tax  Laffer  curve.
62.  The increased  public  deficit  translates  directly  into  higher  public
investment  by .4  percentage  points  of GDP.  which  actually  increases  slightly
more than the  deficit. The real  domestic  interest  costs  of the  government
fall,  due to the lower  real  interest  rate  on government  debt.  Ironically,  the
increase  in government  investment  is greater  than in the  higher  real interest
rate simulation,  although  the increase  in the  public  deficit  is  much higher  in
the  latter. Inflationary  financing  of a  fiscal  expansion  is much cheaper  in
the short-run,  although  there  are serious  distortions  caused  by inf  lat  ion  t:hat
are  not captured  by this  model.
63.  The other  significant  effect  of the  higher  inflation  in the  model is
a drop in  private  consumption. The higher  inflation  tax reduces  the  effective
disposable  income  that  determines  consumption. However,  since  measured
disposable  income  does not include  the  inflation  tax, the  measured  private
saving  rate increases. There  is also  a slight  increase  in the  current  account
deficit  because  of higher  public  investment  and thus  higher  capital  goods
imports.- 33 -
64.  In summary,  higher  inflation  of 6 percentage  points  allows  the fiscal
deficit  to be increased  by .3  percentage  points  of GDP.  This is financed
through  the  inflation  tax  cn private  money balances,  which reduces  private
consumption. With the  current  account  only slightly  changed,  the result  is a
crowding  out of private  consumption  by public  investment.
D.  Conclusion
65.  he results  of the  simulations  can  be s*muarized  by graphs  of public
investment,  public  savings,  and  financing  of  the  public  deficit,  shown  as
ratios  to  GDP  in  Figures  1-3. Figure  4  shows  a graph  of  the  differences  from
the  base  case in  the  current  account  deficit.  public  resource  balance,  and
private  resource  balance.
66.  Figure  la  shows  the  external  financing  of  the  public  deficit  under
alternative  closures.  Only  the  exchange  rate  appreciation  scenario  increases
significantly  the  external  financing,  while  the  high  interest  rate  scenario
strongly  decreases  it  in  the  first  year. This  latter  effect  is  due  to  the
one-time  capital  inflow  to  the  private  sector  induced  by  the  increase  in  the
interest  rate. Figure  lb  shows  the  domestic  financing  of  the  public  sector
deficit.  The  high  interest  rate  case  represents  the  strongest  shift  towards
domestic  financing,  above  all  in  the  first  year  when  the  private  sector  makes
a  one-time  foreign  portfolio  shift  in  response  to  the  interest  rate  increase.
Higher  inflation  also  raises  domestic  financing,  while  an  exchange  rate
appreciation  only  has  a  negligible  effect.  Finally,  Figure  lc  combines  the
two  graphs  into  the  total  financing  of  the  public  deficit.  By  the  end  of  the
period,  a 1OZ  cumulative  real  appreciation  generates  the  strongest  increase  in
deficit  finance.  A 7  percentage  point  rise  in  the  domestic  real  interest  rate- 34  -
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has a stronger  effect  earlier  in  the  period  but is second  by the end of the
proiection.  A  6  percent&ge  point increase  in inflation  has the  weakest
response  in financing.
67.  Figure  2 shows  the effect  of the alternative  simulations  on public
saving.  The strongest  decline  in  public  saving  comes from  increasing  the
domestic  real interest  rate,  which increases  total  interest  costs  because  it
induces  a  shift  to more expensive  domestic  public  debt  and away from  cheaper
foreign  public  debt  as  well as raising  the  cost  of the  existing  domestic  debt
and the additional  total  debt accumulated. A  real  ezchange  rate  appreciation
lowers  public  saving  in the  outer  part  of the  period  because  of the  higher
external  debt and associated  interest  costs.  High inflation  actually  improves
public  saving  slightly  because  of the lower  real  burden  of the domestic  debt.
68.  The final  fiscal  outcome  of the simulations  is the financeable  level
of  public  investment,  shown  in Figure  3.  by the end of the  por.od,  public
investment  under  the  high interest  rate  case is scarcely  different  from  the
base case,  although  the increase  in  the financinS  of the  deficit  is greatest
over  the entire  period  in this  scenario. This shows  how a domestic  debt
spiral  can  wipe out any gains from  increasing  domestic  interest  rates. The
increase  in  public investment  is  greatest  under  the real  exchange  rate
appreciation  case--although  an increasing  debt  burden  is evident  there  as
well.  A  debt spiral  is slower  in  developing  because  the interest  rate  on
external  debt is lower  than  lat  on domestic  debt.  Of course, there  is  no
guarantee  that the required  amount  of external  financing  would be forthcoming
in international  capital  markets.13 Finally,  inflationary  finance  is
effective
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in increasing  public  investment  at no cost in  terms  of public  saving,  although
the  effect  of inflation  on general  economic  efficiency  is not  being  captured.
69.  Figure  4 gives  a  summary  of the  model  results  in terms  of the  effect
on the  changes  in the resource  balances  of the  external  sector,  public  sector,
and  private  sector. 14 We know from  the savings-investment  identity  that  these
changes  must sum  to zero.  we can  see from  this  the  changes  in the  current
account  deficit  and the  private  saving-investment  surplus  that  correspond  to
changes  in the  public  deficit.  Under  the real  exchange  appreciation  case,  the
counterpart  to the increased  public  deficit  is  largely  a  higher  current
account  deficit. In the  high real interest  rate  case,  on the  other  hand,  the
increased  public  deficit  results  in a  higher  private  saving-investment
surplus. This is because  of the  crowding  out  of private  investment  and the
higher  private  saving  out of the  additional  interest  income  on government
debt.  The  current  account  deficit  is actually  decreased  because  of lower
imports  for  investment. Finally,  in the  high inflation  case,  the  counterpart
to the increased  public  deficit  is both  a higher  current  account  deficit  and
higher  private  saving-investment.  The former  is caused  by the capital  goods
imports  required  by higher  public  investment;  the latter  results  from the
higher  nominal  private  saving  associated  with the  inflation  tax.
70  These  solutions  give insight  into  what  would be the  effects  of
changes  in the  fiscal  deficit  and its  financing  composition. An externally-
financed  deficit  increase  would lead  to real  appreciation;  a  fiscal  expansion
14/ The resource  balance  of the  public  sector  is public  saving  minus
investment,  which is not  exactly  equal  to the  public  sector
surplus/deficit  because  the  latter  includes  net lending  by the  public
sector. However,  net lending  is  assumed  not to change,  so that  changes
in the  resource  balance  are  equivalent  to changes  in the  public
surplus/deficit.  The resource  balance  of the  ezternal  sector  is
equivalent  to the  current  account  deficit.- 41  -
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financed  by  domestic  debt  would  lead  to  an  increased  real  interest  rate;  a
money-financed  increase  in  the  deficit  would  lead  to  higher  inflation.
PART  1I:  EXTENSIONS  OF THE  MODEL
71.  While  the  basic  model  presented  above  is  useful  for  dramatizing  the
macroeconomic  consistency  issues,  it  lacks  detail  necessary  to  address  several
policy  issues  that  are  particularly  prominent  in  Colombia  (such  as  trade
liberalization  and  improving  the  efficiency  of  the  financial  sector).  To
address  thes.  issues,  we  extend  the  model  in  several  directions.  Still  using
the  fiscal  closure  as  the  benchmark,  we  consider  cases  in  which  the  external
financing  of  the  public  sector  is  constrained,  with  the  real  exchange  rate
adjusting.  We  also  add  detail  to  the  model  on  the  tax  system  and  banking
system,  most  notably  by  specifying  trade  taxes  as  affecting  both  price
incentives  and  fiscal  revenues,  and  by  distinguishing  between  the  central  bank
and  the  rest  of  the  banking  system.  We  then  consider  variations  in  trade  and
financial  policy. We  also  modify  the  model  to  make  GDP  growth  depend
endogenously  on  total  investment  of  the  previous  year  and  on  a given  parameter
of  investment  efficiency,  instead  of  fixing  it  as  in  the  three  sets  of
simulations  done  with  the  basic  model. The  GDP  growth  equation  is  added  to
dramatize  the  need  for  fiscal  reform  to  accompany  structural  reform  measures.
For,  as  will  be  shown  in  the  simulation  discussed  below,  structural  reforms
would  call  for  greater  fiscal  stringency  and  thus  result  in  lower  public
investment  ald  growth,  unless  revenues  are  enhanced  and/or  current  (non-
investment)  expenditures  are  reduced.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  model  only
focuses  on  the  short-run  macroeconomic  implications  of  policy  reforms.  It
thus  ignorer  the  possible  gains  in  allocative  efficiency  and  growth  induced  by- 43 -
improved  policy  regimes  (i.e.,  there  is  no improvement  in factor  productivity
assumed  in the  model  as a result  of reform-;  the  magnitude  of these  effects  is
unknown  but  would  presumably  be substantial  in  the long run). Although  the
computational  cost (in  terms  of staff  effort)  of these  changes  was not
trivial,  the  extended  model  provides  several  vital insights  not present  in  the
simpler  basic  version.
IV.  EXTERNAL  FINANCING  CONSTRAINT
72.  The  model  under  the fiscal  closure  described  above  has no limit  on
the  amount  of external  financing  from  abroad. It is implicitly  assumed  that
any fiscal  or current  account  deficit  can  be financed. However,  Colombia  has
faced  severe  limits  on access  to external  borrowing  like  most other  developing
countries  after  the  debt  crisis.  To  take  this  constraint  into  account,  the
model  has to be extended  to include  an exogenous  limit  on public  sector
external  borrowing  (private  sector  borrowing  is  already  limited  in the
previous  version).
73.  If public  sector  borrowing  requirement  is  greater  than the  exogenous
external  credit  supply,  then some  other  variable  has  to adjust  to reconcile
zhe  behavior  of the trade  account  with capital  inflows. The  obvious  candidate
for  the adjusting  variable  is the real  exchange  rate, (and  thus implicitly
public  spending)  which  was  fixed  as  a policy  target  in the  previous  version  of
the  model.  We modify  the  model  by adding  a solution  algorithm  that
depreciates  the  real  exchange  rate  (through  changes  in  the  nominal  exchange
rate)  whenever  the  requirements  for  foreign  financing  exceed  the  supply.  The
depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  will  lower  the  current  account  deficit44  -
through  the  response  of exports  and imports  to the  relative  price  change.
Since  public  external  borrowing  is the  residual  for  the  balance  of pay:ents,
this  will also lower  public  borrowing,  until it is consistent  with foreign
credit  availability. As before,  the  fiscal  deficit  endogenously  adjusts  to  be
consistent  with financing  availability,  so a real  exchange  rate  depreciation
will be supported  by lower  public  expenditure.
74.  The economic  rationale  for  this  procedure  is that for  given  targets
on inflation  and the  real interest  rate,  the  fiscal  deficit  must decrease  to
be consistent  with available  financing. The reduction  of the  fiscal  deficit
lowers  demand  for  domestic  goods,  which depreciates  the  equilibrium  real
exchange  rate,  which in turn  makes  the  trade  account  also consistent  witH
financing  availability.
73.  Tables  6 and 7 show  solutions  of the  model  vith and  without  the real
exchange  rate  adjustment,  where Table  6 represents  the  new  base case
(different  from the  one  presented  in  Table  1),  calibrated  more closely  to  the
expected  effects  and  the  Government  response  to the  drastically  lower  coffee
prices  and the  war  with the  narcotraffickers.  With a fixed  target  f-r the
real exchange  rate (i.e.,  no adjustment).  the fiscal  deficit  increases  over
1990-94,  reflecting  the  deterioration  of  the  external  accounts  due to lower
coffee  export  prices  in 1989-90  and  the  decline  in  oil export  volumes  after
1992.  The larger  current  account  deficit  implies  a larger  flow  of financing
to the  public  sector,  so  public  investment  and the  deficit  both increase.
However,  when public  sector  financing  is constrained  (at  numbers  projected  by
the Banco  de la  Reopblica  to reflect  financing  availability),  steady  real




(No  Exehange  Rate  Adjusteent)
--  is  torical  -------  Estimated---*-----PrCej5ct5d---------------------------
1980  1967  1986  1969  1990  1991  1992  '1993  .394
COP Growth  Rate  s.25s  3.771  3.10S  2.601  5.461  5.78%  5.92%  8.18S
Investant  Crowth  Rete  4.065  7.76s  -4.60S  12.32%  0.61S  8.151  9.32%  10.00O
Pr i vate  14.36X  6.22X  -9.461  2.72S  5.54X  S.84%  6.68S%  e.24
Public  -13.501  11.23X  8.221  29.91X  12.811  6e.571  13.361  14,891
COP per  capita  Growth  Rate  1.281  0.79X  3.681  3.91S  3.95S  4.301
Consumption  per  capita  growth  rate  2.271  -0.064  3.18%  3.881  3.96X  4.35S
Cross  Investmant/Cop  16.0O0  19.U41  20.691  19.21S  21.03S  21.641  21.71S  22.431  23.241
Domestic  Sawings/GOP  21.77S  21.731  21.371  20.541  21.21%  21.561  21.73X  21.72X  21.891
National  Savings/GOP  19.82X  19.t00  19.635  18.151  16.OS  18.401  10.361  18.39%  18.37X
Marginal  National  Savings  Rate  21.?21  -40.661  11.92S  -12.49S  -34.411  14.50i  9.001  11.79S  13.71X
Private  Investment/40P  11.34t  13.63X  14.04S  12.43S  12.451  12.461  12.401  12.47%  12.468
Privete  Consumption/GOP  69.011  69.44s  69.65s  70.181  69.641  69.32S  A9.141  89.15X  69.19S
Private  Savings/CDP  12.0fe  14.215  14.12X  12.741  12.3SS  12.211  11.961  11.83X  11.72%
Private  Resource talonce/GoC  0.721  0.6en  0.041  0.31S  -0.091  -0.25%  -0.461  -0.63X  -0.75X
Public  Investment/Co  6.ttS  6.01  6.53X  6.7t1  t.591  9.161  9.25X  9.961  10.76e
Public  Sevings/GOP  7.US  C5.391  6.41X  5.761  5.73X  4.191  O.37S  6.564  6.65%
Public  R.evnues/GDP  24.861  22.671  22.401  22.401  21.S9S  22.15%  22.231  22.30%  22.32X
Public  Expenditures/COP  25.00%  24.491  24.61X  24.73X  26.061  26.47%  26.441  27.03%  27.78s
Public  Oeficit/GOP  0.325  1.921  2.111  2.331  4.163  4.32S  4.21X  4.73S  5.441
WLT  External  Financing  4.501  -0.19S  1.1611  0.t651  . 3.31X  3.921  4.00S  4.40S  5.23S
(External  Financing  availability)  4.601  -0.19S  1.16S  0.86C  1.10  0.9tS  0.661  0.5SS  0.56s
ST  Extiernal  Financing  -2.40X  -0.36e  0.21S  0.03%  -0.20S  0.0oe  -0.145  0.05%  0.04%
Doestic finencing-financial  system  -2.63S  2.07S  1.26X  1.10  0.82X  0.0S  0.101  0.03X  -0.083
From  Banco  doe  I Republics  -2.49S  1.721  0.271  0, US  0.t1  0.311  0.53S  0.59S  0.SS%
From Rest  of Financial  System  -0.13X  0.35!  0.991  0.24S  0.01S  -0.22X  -0.431  -0.564  -0.67s
omestic financing-private  sector  -0.011  0.42S  0.091  -0.09S  0.2es  0.26X  0.25S  0.25X  025S
Residual  0.865  -0.12S  -0.62S  0.44S  0.0011O O.0  0.001  0.00  0.00
Reel  exchange  rote  ndex  100.00  95.6o  95.66  91.66  95.66  95.66  96.60
Real  Elxhaege  Rate  Oprecletlen,.-)  -4.325  0.00Q  0.001  0.001  0.00  0.00
Deeeti  If  ltien  22.67S  29.37!  27.001  2T.00  24.001  23.001  22.001  21.00S
ExchangieRa  ite  DePreiatie  24.893  23.31X  29.361  19.501  1.5511  17.59S  16.831  15.681
Nominal  tnteret  Itate  30.901  31.221  34.135  33.001  30.911  29.t61  21.815  27.76'  26.72%
Real  Interest  Rate  S. WS  4.461  4.72S  4.72S  4.721  4.721  4.72%  4.72-
Loan  Rate  41.101  39.001  42.961  43.401  40.801  39.501  38.201  36.901  35.60%
Real  Loan  Rate  13.13S  11.37X  12.91S  12.641  12.501  12.36X  12.21%  12.07S
Covernment  Interest  Rate  30.901  31.221  34.131  33.001  30.91S  29.866  26.811  27.76X  26.72s
Rate  on  Forced  Investment  20.001  20.0011  20.00S  20.001  20.001  20.001
Forced  Investment  Ratio  7.611  7.661  7.866  7.  4u  7.641  7.066  7.661  7.86e  7.86X
Reserve  ratio  11.6OO  11.60t1 11.60  11.601  11.O01  11.6OS  11.60!  11.601  11.6O0
Stock  of MI/GOP  11.621  11.941  11.271  10.69S  10.93X  10.96X  10.97S  10.99S  11.01I
Stock  of  Quasi-money/GOP  21.521  21.421  19.511  19.501  19.631  19.39S  19.201  19.12S  19.081
Stock  of  credit  to private  sector/GOP  34.161  35.35X  34.92X  35.041  35.331  35.041  34.961  36.111  3S.36e
Export  Growth  Rate  7.60  -0.36S  6.42S  9.1tS  6.011  8.275  3.90S  3.041
Crowth  rate  manufacturing  exports  -5.001  6.071  4.95X  6.875  2.6os  6.49X  5.761  6.621  6.181
Exports/GDP  19.01S  17.741  17.171  16.415  17.621  17.48X  17.591  17  01S  16.341
Import  Growth  Rate  -3.693  5.451  3.U5S  4.60O  0.20S  6.865  6.721  7.195
Growth  rate  ;ntermediate  itmrts  -5.001  C.071  16.10  5.051  2.600  5.401  5.73S  6.t21  6.l16
Groeth  rate  Private  capital  imprts  14.3t%  6.221  -9.701  2.721  5.541  5.84%  5.361  6.241
Growth  rate  Private  cene  Imprts  6.c6n  4.431  2.621  1.651  4.96X  6.511  5.822  6.241
Tax  Rate on  Impert.  24.291  22.241  22.241  22.24X  22.241  22.241  22.24X
Imports/C1P  16.245  15.C55  16.39N  17.071  17.441  17.141  17.575  17.721  17.691
Current  Acceunt  Deficit  (in  US9eill)  -565.20  -21.40  414.604  275.69 1252.74  1517.60 1743.16  2318  80  3100.47
Current  Account  Deficit/COP  -1.621  -0.01  1.041  0.701  2.951  3.24X  3.361  4.041  4.671
Net International  Reeves  (USSINII)  3477.70  3455.50 3799.50 3669.50 3922.00  4366.9n 4638.81  5420.61  8101.17
Net  Reserves  (in  months  imports)  12.24  10.93  10.10  9.62  9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00
Tetel  lxternal  Debt  Ratio  39.411  42.49S  30.905  39.61S  40.771  41.30S  41.631  42.141  43.42X
Public  Debt  Ratio  36.621  42.641  40.7?1  41.221  41.75C  41.39X  41.011  41.301  42.23S




(W;th  Exchango  Ret-  Adjust  ent)
---------  H;tor;C& -------  Estimatedt---------  d.oc -
1986  1987  1:28  1989  !.90  .931  .;.  .3  ij
Z,9p  '.owth  Rate  5s26%  3.771  3.10S  2.ICI  4,571  4  4  4  * 331
Investment  Orooth  Rate  4.051  7,763  -4,502  2.$31  2  de  ;1  j;5%  6.d'l
pr  Vats  14,352  8.22x  -9.402  2.72S  4  64X  '  4.%  el s  * 3;S
Publ;c  -13.50S  11.23X  6.22X  2.47X  -2.38'  %  -. ,. 1  .0e:11  8:1.
3CP por  capita  .rooth  Rate  1.28  0.791  2.73%  2.S.X  2.3v1  2.48s
Conmumpt;on  per  capita  growth  rate  2.27S  -0.25%  1.921  2.  ::S  2,282  2.-8S
Croes  Investment/GOP  18.005  19.S4X  20.59S  19.21X  19.S6a  19.31X  18.93X  19.36X  19.68%
Oomestic  Savings/GOP  21.77X  21.73X  21.37X  20.64%  21.24X  21.79X  22,081  22.105  22.071
National  Savingo/GOP  19.62X  19.6021 19.53X  18.61X  17.84S  18.301  18.465  18.69S  18.871
Marginal  Notionel  Savings  Rate  21.72X -60.SOS  11.921 -12.495 -44.83X  16.265  10.39X  13.801  16.191
Private  Investment/COP  11.343  13.53X  14.061  12.43X  12.601  12.811  12.661  12.89X  12.95
Private  Consumption/GOP  69.01X  69.441  69.s61  70.10%  69.63S  69.061  68.79S  66.77X  66.60
Private  Savings/GOP  12.061  14.21X  14.122  12.74X  12.27X  12.16X  11.91X  11.72%  11.54
Private  Resource  Balance/COP  0.72S  0.6OS  0.06o  0.31X  -0.40X  -0.66C  -0.96S  -1.17X  -1.41
Public  Investment/a3P  O.U%  0.013  0.53X  6.7631  6.S95  6.501  6.07s  6.461  6.73
Public  Savings/GP  7.6e1  5.393  1.413  5.761  6.573  6.143  6.S41  6.961  7.33
Public Revenues/COP  24.661  22.67X  22.403  22.40S  21.995  22.31X  22,41%  22.481  22.52
Public  Expendit4roe/GOP  26.00%  24.49S  24.611  24.73X  24.64X  24.00%  23.27S  23.2tX  23.25
Public  Doficit/GOP  0.321  1.025  2.111  2.33X  2.65X  1.693  0.86s  0.825  0.73S
xliT  External  Financing  4.601  -0.1O  1.1SS  0..6  1.19  1.1011  0.7ex  0.673  0.70
(External  Financing  svmilability)  4.60X  -0.19S  1.1SX  0.8611  1.19S  1.101  0.78X  0.871  0.70
ST  External  Financing  -2.40X  -0.36X  0.21X  0.03X  -0.22X  0.07S  -. !l  ."1  01  0.o51
Ooe_stic  f;nancing-financial  system  -2.633  2.07X  1.263  1.101  1.42X  0.271  O.OCC  -0.161  -0.2'%
From  Bance  de la  Republics  -2.49X  1.721  0.271  0.83%  1.63X  0.731  0.74%  0.75S  0.83
From  Rest  of Financial  System  -0.131  0.353  0.99S  0.24S  -0.12X  -0.461  -0,74S  -0.91%  -1.59
Domestic  financing-private  sector  -0.011  0.42X  0.09X  -0.09X  0.26X  0.26e  1.25S  0.25%  0.2'
Residual  0.86S  -0.123  -0.62X  0.44X  0.00X  0.00  .005  0.001  0.00
Real  exchange  rat*  index  100.00  96.60  63.02  63.90  62.63  61.96  uO.sM
Real  Exchange  Rate  Oepreciatln(-)  -4.32S  -S.00S  -4.69s  -1.SO  -0.821  -1.72
Doestic Inflation  22.37X  21.372  27.003  25.003  24.00S  23.00X  22.001  21.00
Exchange  Rat*  Depreclatien  24.1ns  23.313  29.363  29.901  24.301  19.39X  17.601  17.70
Nominal  Interest  Rate  30.903  31.22X  34.13S  33.001  30.911  29.861  28.J1X  27.76X  26.72
Real  Interest  Rate  6.303  4.480  4.721  4.72X  4.72X  4.72X  4.72X  4.72
Loan  late  41.101  39.003  42.963  43.402  40.80X  39.50X  38.20X  36.90X  36.60
Real  Loan  Rate  13.13%  11.371  12.91X  12.641  12.50X  12.36X  12.21X  12.07
Covernment  Interest  Rate  30.90%  31.22%  34.13%  33.00S  30.91X  29.86X  26.81X  27.761  26.72
Rote  on Forceod  Investment  20.00%  20.00X  20.001  20.00S  20.001  20.00
Forced  Investsent  Ratio  7.66s  7.861  7.3631  7  7.863  7.a86  7.86s  7.86a  7.986  7.86
Reserve  ratio  11.60%  11.601  11.60  11.600  11.6OX  11.6o0  11.6o0  11.601  11.60
Stock  of  Wi/COP  11.623  11.94%  11.27%  10.99  10.93X  10.965  10.972  10.99X  11.01
Stock  of  Quasi-money/GOP  21.52X  21.42%  19.51%  19.60S  19.602  19.481  19.451  19.512  19.60
Stock  of credit  to private  sactor/GOP  34.18X  36.36X  34.92%  35.041  36.47S  35.60e  36.011  36.641  37.35
Export  Croath  Rate  7.60S  -0.36S  6.42S  11.93X  7.402  8.271  3.73S  3.15
Growth  rate  Manufacturing  exports  -S.001  6.071  4.96S  6.33%  11.21X  9.62s  5.97X  5.02S  61.
Exports/GOP  19.011  17.74X  17.17S  10.41%  19.64X  20.675  21.61  21.39X  21.2.
Import  Growth  Rote  -3.69%  6.463  3.665  -0.72X  2.101  3 212  4.272  3.95%
Growth  rate intermediate  imports  -S.00%  6.07S  16.102  5.331  -1.99S  1.893  3.492  3.67%  3.3
Growth  rote  private  capital  imports  14.36S  8.221  -9.463  -0.76e  2.602  3.76X  3.S6X  3.6
Growth  rate  Private  cons imports  6.56%  4.431  3.101  -2.77X  1.063  3.065  3.643  3.3
Tax  Rate  cn Imports  24.261  22.243  22.24X  22.24X  22.24X  22.24X  22.2
Imports/GOP  15.24X  16.56%  16.390  17.07%  17.961  13.39%  18.471  18.8653 I.:
Current  Account  DOficit  (in  USImill)  -666.20  -21.40  414.60  271.69  672.11  411.49  211.66  313.41  416.1
Cwrrent  Account  Doficit/GDP  -1.62%  -0.063  1.00X  0.701  1.72X  1.01X  0.461  0.661  0.8
Net Int.rnotional  Regervee  (15hi111)  3477.70 3451.560  3761.50  i89.0  3629.17 3633.61 4117.56 4493.66 4877.56
Net  Reserves  (in  months  impoits)  12.24  10.93  10.10  9.62  9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00  9.00
Total  External  Debt  Ratio  39.41X  42.49D  38.90%  39.113  41.91X  41.801  39.895  37.86X  36.3
Public  DObt  Ratio  36.62X  42.64X  40.7631 41.221  43.10%  41.911  39.07X  36-386  34.1_ 47  -
capaclty  :rom  the  previous  year's  iL.rJ,stment.  In the  constrained  external
fal  ln  >th  the  fiscal  deficit  and  cu.rent  account  deficit,  with public
inve4tment  the  main adjusting  variable.
76.  The  growth  rate is set  exogenously  in 1990  to reflect  short-term
projections. Beginning  in 1991,  the  growth  rate  is  given  by the  expansion  in
financing  case,  the  growth  rate  falls  slightly  after  1991,  reflecting  the fall
in public  investment  required  by consistency  with available  foreign  financing.
In the  model,lower  growth  lowers  the financing  availability  to the  public
sector,  since  domestic  financial  assets  and thus  domestic  loans  to the  public
sector  do not grow  as fast.  In  contrast,  growth  rises  in the  unconstrained
financing  case because  of higher  public  investment,  which  also increases  the
financeable  public  deficit. However,  the  faster  growth  is  not enough  to  keep
up  with the increase  in  external  debt,  so that  the  external  debt ratio  rises
in the  unconstrained  financing  case.  It seems  clear  that  this  scenario  is  not
feasible  either  from  the standpoint  of the long-run  budget  constraint  or the
short-term  restrictions  on external  credit  supply.
V.  MACRO  REQUIREMENTS  OF POLICY REFORKS
77.  The  model  with  external  financing  constrair;t  can  be  used  to  address  a
central  policy  issue  in Colombia--what  macro  policies  should  accompany  trade
liberalization,  either  through  relaxation  of quantitative  restrictions  or
lowering  of tariffs. It  can also  consider  the  macro requirements  of financial
liberalization  and reduction  of inflation.- 48  -
A.  Policy  SLmulation  I: Lowering  Import  Tariffs
78.  Reduction  of tariffs  will have two important  eff  3  in the  model.
It  will  decrease  the relative  price  of imported  goods,  increasing  the  quantity
demanded  for  a given  real exchange  rate. At the same  time,  it lowers  public
revenue  from taxation  of trade, 15 requiring  an offsetting  fiscal  adjustment
for  a  given  amount  of financing. Of course,  trade  liberalization  brings
important  efficiency  gains  that  are  not captured  by our  model,  as  well as
improving  export  incentives  by lowering  the  cost  of inputs. The focus  of the
model is instead  on the short-run  and  especially  on the  exchange  rate
depreciation  and fiscal  adjustment  that is  required  by trade  liberalization.
79.  Table  8 shows  the  results  of a simulation  of a reduction  of 4
percentage  points  in the  tarifx  in  both 1990  and 1991 (for  a total  of 8
percentage  points  over a two-year  period),  compared  with the  Base  Case (Table
7,Base  Case  with Exchange  Rate  Adjustment). If no other fiscal  adjustment
occurs,  the loss  of revenues  would  require  a reduction  in public  investment,
which  would lower  the  growth  rate  by almost  half a  percentage  point  by the  end
of the  period. 16 The lower  growth  rate in turn requires  additional  fiscal
austerity,  since  lower  growth  implies  domestic  credit  will not grow as fast.
This lower  growth  is  not a  necessary  consequence  of tariff  reductior.--  it
15/  Unless  the  elasticity  of imports  is  high enough  to increase  the  tax
base  enough  to offset  the  decline  in the rate,  which  it is  not in our
simulation.
16/  This presumes  that  public  and  private  investment  are  equally
productive. If public  investment  is less  productive  the  growth  effect
will be less  than that indicated.TAILS  I
SIWULATION DIFFEURINCES  PROW  SASE CASE
FISCAL CLOSURE
TRADE  T4XES CASE
(With  Exchange  Rate  Adjustmont)
-__  __  -_Proj*cte  d------------------------
1990  1901  1992  1993  1994
COP Crowth  Rate  0.00%  -0.22%  -0.45!  -0.443  -0.43S
:nvostment  Crowth  Rate  -2.33X  -2.84X  -0.475  -0.24!  -0.31S
Pr  Vats  O.00%  -0.22X  -0.4O  -0.44!  -0.43S
Pwbiic  -O.59!  -6,31S  -1.32X  1.03X  0.39!
CDP per  capita  Growth  Rate  0.00!  -0.21X  -0.44X  -0.43%  -0.42X
Consumption  per capta  growth  rate  0.37X  0.22!  -0.42X  -0.42%  -0.41X
Gross  Invostment/COP  -0.3O  3  -0.615  -0.82%  -0.827  -0.62!
Domestie  Savinga/COP  -0.32!  -0.67!  -0.68!  -0.66!  -0.69!
National  Savings/COP  -0.37X  -0.77!  -0.73!  -0.77!  -0.77X
Marginal  National  Savings  Rate  -14.C5X  -10.06!  -1.63X  -1.40!  -1.13!
Private  Investm.nt/GP  0.04!  0.06  0.07!  0.06%  0.0 3
Private  Conoumption/50P  0.32!  0.67!  O.663  0.63!  0.691
Private  Savings/GOP  0.06!  0.11!  0.11!  0.12f  0.132
Private  Resource  *alance/OW#  OGlX  0.03!  OO.6  0.06!  OS  0.0
Public  Invostment/COP  -0.42!  -0.69!  -0.69!  -0.67!  -O.S7!
Public  Savings/GOP  -0.42!  -O.3iX  -0.39!  -0.69%  -0.  90
Public  Revonuoe/GOP  -O.373  -0.79!  -0.60!  -O.SO!  -O.6N
Public  Expendituros/COP  -0.37!  -0.603  -0.60!  -0.79  -0.76!
Public  Deficit/CODP  -O.OOS  -OO.1  0.00!  0.02!  0.0!X
WLT External  Financing  0.051  0.03X  0.02!  0.02!  0.02!
(External  Financing  availability)  0.ON  0.03!  0.02!  0.02!  0.02!
ST  External  Financing  . . -0.00!  0.00!  -O.00!X O.OO  OO.
Domestic  financing-fintncial  sytm  -0.02!  -O0.0S  -0.02!  -OO1!  O.01x
From  Banco  de  Is  Republica  -0.02!  -0.03X  -OO1S  -0.01X  -O.OOl
From  Rest  of Financial  System  O.OUI  0  0.009  -0.013  0.001  0.011
Do_etic financing-privte  soector  O0.00  0.00!  0.0O!  0.00!  0.003
Residual  0.0O!  0.00!  0.00!  0.00!  0.001
Rep! oxchange  rat. 1nd#4  -1.32  -2.19  -1.79  -1.51  -1.22
Roal  Exchange  Rate  Oeproeiotion(-)  -1.863  -1.06!  0.46X  0.34X  0.921
Dometic  Inflation  0.00!  0.00!  0.00X  0.00!  0.001
Exchange  Rat.  Depreciation  1.96W  1.42!  -0.64X  -O.4O!  -0.361
Nominal  Interest  Rxte  0.00!  OO.  O.OC!  0.00%  0.00!
Real  Intersat  Rate  O.OO  OO.  O.OO  0.007S  0.00!
Loan  Rate  0.00!  O.OO  O.OOS  0.00!  0.009
Roal  Loan  Rate  0.00  0.00!  0.00!  O  S  0.00!  OO.
Government  Yntoreost Rat.  O.OO  0.003  O.OO  O.OO  0.00%
Rate  on Fore-d  Invostment  0.00X  0.00!  O.OO  0.00!  O.OO
For.ed  Invostment  Ratio  O.OOS  O.OO  0.003  0.00%  0.00!
Reserve  ratio  0.00!  0.00!  0.003  0.00!  0.003
Stock  of MI/COP  -0.00!  -0.00!  O.OO  0.00!  OO.0
Stock  of Quasi-monoy/GOP  0.02X  0.O0X  0.17!  0.24X  0.30X
Stock  of credit  to private  sector/COP  0.033  0.13X  0.26!  0.30%  0.43!
Export  Growth  Rate  0.46!  0.32!  -0.32X  -0.26X  -0.2ES
Growth  rate  manufacturing  exports  1.495  0.94X  -0.93S  -0680%  -0.77!
Exports/COP  3.39!  0.76S  0.71!  0.67!  0.64X
Import  Crowth  Rat.  0.27!  0.10!  -0.24%  -0.30S  -0.30!
Growth  rot4  intermediate  imports  1.501  1.46X  -0.19S  -0.25X  -0.25X
Growth  rat.  private  capitai  ;Oports  1.14X  1.o6s  -0.25X  -0.291  -0.29!
Crowth  rat.  private  cons  imports  1.67!  1.69!  -0.17X  -0.24X  -0.24X
Tax  Rate  on  Imports  -4.011  -S.0O!  -3.00X  -6.00%  -6.00!
Importa/GDP  0.32!  0.02!  0.57%  0.64X  0.13X
Current  Account  Deficit  (in  USMOill)  -13.69  -23.92  -25.41  -29.25  -31.06
Current  Account  Oeficit/COW  -0.01X  -0.04X  -0.06X  -0.04!  -0.06X
Net  International  Reserves  (US10ill)  14.24  26.70  25.51  17.74  8.23
Net  Reserves (in  months  ismorts)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Total  External  Oebt Ratio  0.04X  1.213  1.15X  1.12!  1.11X
Public  DObt Ratio  0.55X  1.02X  0.96!  0.963  0.97!S  so  -
occurs  only because  the locus  of the fiscal  adjustment  is  public  investment.
If other  tax  revenues  were substituted  for  trade  tariffs,  then  the  fall  in
public  investment  and  growth  would  not  take  place.  This  suggests  the
importance  of a  more general  tax reform  to accompany  the  reduction  of tariff
rates.  In any  case,  empirical  studies  suggest  that  greater  openness  is
associated  with about  one  and  a half percentage  points  higher  growth. 17 While
it is difficult  to calibrate  the effect  of the reform  considered  here, it
seems  likely  that  the  net growth  effect  would  be positive  even  without  fiscal
reform.
80.  The lowering  of tariffs  also requires  additional  real  depreciation
beyond  that  in the  base case--slightly  over 1  more percentage  point  each in
1990 and  1991.  In 1992-94,  however,  there  is slightly  less real  depreciation
than ir the  base case.  The cumulative  additional  real  depreciation  is  only
1.3  percent,  lower  than thc  reduction  of tariff  rates  of 8  percentage  points.
The reason  is that  the  contraction  of public  investment  because  of lower
tariff  revenues  itself  lowers  imports  while the  devaluation  also raises
exports,  so that  the stimulative  effect  on imports  from lower  tariff  rates
does  not  have to be fully  offset  by currency  depreciation.
81.  The  policy  does  have the  desired  effect  of raising  the share  of
tradeable  goods in  GDP--the  import  and export  shareo  are  each  higher by over
half of one  percentage  point  of GDP.  The export  share  rises  because  of the
additional  real  currency  depreciation. The  economic  intuition  is that  tariff
protection  in the  past led to an overvalued  exchange  rate  that repressed
17/  Easterly  and  Wetzel (1989)  show that  a dummy  variable  measuring  outward
orientation  is  associated  with higher  growth  of one  and  a half
percentage  points  across  countries.S  1  -
export  potential. Lowering  tariffs  induces  real  depreciation  back  towards  the
song  run  equilibrium  rate,  raising  the  share  of exports  and imports  in  G:P.
Greater  outward  orientation  should  bring  higher  productivity  growth  in the
tradeable  goods  sector  as a result  of increased  competition  and lower  import
costs,  resulting  in  higher  GDP growth. But this  effect  is  not estimated  by
the  mode'
B.  Policy  Simulation  II:  Relaxing  Import  Quotas
82.  The  other  trade  policy  shift  we consider  is a relaxation  of import
quotas. To avoid  complicating  the  model further,  we have to  address  this
policy  shift  in a roundaiout  fashion. Quotas  lead  to a premium  on the
imported  goods  whose  quantities  are limited. Thus,  they  can  be treated  as
equivalent  to a tariff,  but  without  the revenue  implications  of tariff  rate
changes.  The  relaxation  of  the  quota  is  simulated  by  specifying  a  reduction
in  the  quota  premium,  which  lowers  the  price  of  imports  relative  to  that  of
domestic  subst'.tutes.
83.  The results  of a  policy  simulation  of lowering  the  quota  premium  by 4
percentage  points  each  in 1990 and  1991 (for  a total  of 8 percentage  points)
is  shown  in  Table  9.  The  relaxation  of  the  quota  induces  an  additional  real
depreciation  of  about  1.  Z  per  year  in  1990-91.  The  exchange  rate
depreciation  does  not  need  to  be  as  great  as  the  quota  premium  reduction,
because  exchange  rate  changes  also  bring  forth  an  export  response.  Thus,  both
export  and  import  shares  expand  by  almost  1  percentage  point  of  GDP.
84.  The  effect  of  the  additional  exchange  rate  devaluation  on  public
sector  financing  is  small  but  complicated.  The  expansLon  in  imports  requiresTABLE 9
SIMULATION:  DIFFERENCES  FROM  BASE CASE
FISCAL CLOSURt
QUOTA  CASE
(With  Exchange  Rate Adj ustment)
--- P rojected.-------  .----------  _-_-_
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
COP Growth  Rate  0.001  -0.051  -0.101  -Q.07S1  -0.03!
Invostment  Growth  Rite  -06X3  -0.641  0  191  0.13X  0.061
Prievat  O.OOX  -0.05X  -0.101  -0.07S  -0.061
Public  -1.84X  -1.62X  0.63X  0.86e  0.30S
GOP per  capita  Growth  Rate  0.00  -0.06X  -0.101  -0.07S  -0.06S
Consumption  per capita  growth  rate  -0.0C  -0.101  -0.061  -0.07X  -0.064
Grose  Investment/GOP  -0.03X  -0.061  -0.02X  0.01X  0.031
Oometic Savings/OP  0.011  0.02X  0.011  0.02X  0.02X
National  Savings/Cop  -0.06X  -O.OX  -0.10X  -0.10S  -0.09S
Marginal  Notional  Savings  Rate  -2.121  -1.189  -0.09X  O.101  0.191
Private Invost.ent/COP  0.06  0.011  0.0X1  0.061  0.0S1
Private  Consueption/COP  -0.011  -0.02X  -0.01S  -0.02X  -0.02X
Private  Soings/COP  -0.0711 -. 161  -0.191  -0.21X  -0.231
Private  Resource  Salance/COP  -0.122  -0.2t11  -0.291  -0.30t  -0.31X
Public  Investoent/GDP  -0.063  -0.1CX  -0.10X  -0.071  -0.0C
Public  Savinge/CaP  0.02X  0.06X  0.091  0.12X  0.14X
Public  Revwnu-os/CU  0.061  0.1X  0.16X  0.14X  0.1C5
Public  Exp.nditurais/GO  -0.02X  -. OOX  -0.06X  -0.04X  -0.061
Public  Oefirit/WO  -0.10  -0.21X  -0.20X  -0.191  -0.191
WLT  External  Financing  0.02X  0.04X  0.02S  0.02%  0.02%
(External  Financing  availability)  0.02X  0.04X  0.02%  0.021  0.02X
ST External  Financing  -0.00X  O.OOS  -0.011  0.001  0.003
Oomestic  financing-financial  system  -0.12X  -0.2tX  -0.21X  -0.21S  -0.21X
From Banco  de  lo  Ropublics  -0.06%  -0.13X  -0.07%  -0.061  -0.06O
From  Rest  of Financial  System  -0.0  3  -0.12X  -0.13X  -0.14X  -0.1CX
Dometic  financing-private  sector  -0.001  -O.OOt  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001
Residual  0.001  0.OOX  O.OOX  O.OOX  0.001
Reel  exchange  rate  index  -1.59  -2.67  -2.32  -2.21  -2.13
Reel  Exchange  Rate  Depreciatlon(-)  -1.661  -1.34X1  0.3X  0.121  0.06O
ome_tIc Inflation  O.1OOX  0.001  O  O.OX  0.0011  0.00
Exchange  Rate  Dopriciasion  2.311  1.77X  -0.46%  -0.14X  -0.06O
Nominal Interost  Rate  0.001  0.0OX  0.001  0.00%  0.001l
Real  Interest  Rate  0.0OX  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00
Loan  Rat  O.OOX  0.001  0.001  0.00  0.00
Real  Loan  Rate  0.0OX  0.001  0.00%  O.OOX  0.001
Government  Interest  Rate  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0 OVS
Rate  on  Forced  Investment  0.003  0.00  0.001  0.001  O  .00
Forced  Inv,amoent  Ratio  0.00  0.001  0.001  0.00  0.00111
Reserve  ratio  0.003  0.OO  0.00  0.00  0.001
Stock  of  Wi/GOP  -0.001  -0.001  0.00%  0.001  0.001
Stock  of  Quasi-money/CP  -0.023  -0.071  -O.11S  -0.16S  -0.193
Stock  of  credit  to  private  *ector/WOP  0.03  0.101  0.16X  0.19X  0.221
Expert  Grooth  Rate  0.173  0.4 X  -0.161  -0.01X  -0.011
Growth  rate  mnufacturing  experts  1.761  1.3n9  -0.501  -0.191  -0.11O
Exportc/COP  0.4  0.t  0  O0X  0.831  0.0C  0.7O  1
Imoert  Growth  Rate  0.C50  0.621  0.13S  -0.001  -0.03O
Growth  rete  intarmeiate Imprts  1.343  1.471  0.121  -0.001  -0.033
Growth  rate  prIvate  capital imorts  1.023  1.10I  0.073  -0.021  -0.083
Growth  rate  private  cone  imprts  1.231  1.36I  0,121  -0.011  -0.043
Tox  Rate  on  Imprte  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00O
Imports/COP  0.4tX  0.623  O06OX  0.79S  0.60
Current  Account  Deficit  (in  USimill)  -4.31  2.64  29.41  39.96  47.22
Current  4ccount  Deficit/CO  0.023  0.041  OOX  0.11S  0.121
Net International  Reserve  (USImill)  26.32  63.10  77.93  ". 21  93.06
Net  Relbrves  (in  months imprt)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Total  External  Debt  Rltli  o.77  1.401  1.21X  1.13X  1.0 
Public  Debt  Ratio  0.563  0.69  0.563  0.40S  0.271- 53 -
more  reserve  accumulation,  which  reduces  the  financing  available  from  the
central  bank.  The  increased  imports  also lead  to  more conventional  tariff
revenues,  which raise  public  saving  and  lover  private  saving. The exchange
rate  devaluation  raises  the interest  cost  of public  external  debt,  however,
whicb roughly  offsets  the  increased  tariff  revenues. The  net effect  is to
lover  slightly  the  amount  of public  investment  that is financeable  in the
absence  of other  fiscal  adjustment,  which lowers  growth  slightly  (by  about .1
percentage  point). Again,  this  growth  effect  could  be avoided  by raising
revenues  or cutting  other  expenditures. In  any case  the  effect  on growth  is
much less  than in the  case  of tariff  reductions,  and  in any  case  would likely
be offset  by efficiency  improvements  that  are  not captured  by the  model.
C.  Policy  Simulation  III:  Lowering  Resarve  and  Forced  Investment  Ratio
85.  Another  policy  change  that  can  be addressed  by our  model is  a change
in the  required  reserve  ratio  of the  banking  system,  as well as a change  in
their  required  holdings  of low-yielding  development  fund  assets. For this  it
was necessary  to extend  the  model  presented  in Part  I.  Instead  of an
aggregate  monetary  sector,  we distinguish  between  the  central  bank (Banco  de
la Rephblica  or BR) and  the rest  of the  banking  system  (RFS).
U6.  13  holds  all  of the international  reserves  of the  banking  system  (by
law).  Its  other  assets  are  domestic  credit  to the  government,  domestic  credit
to the private  sector,  and  credit  to the  banking  system. The latter  includes
both rediscounts  of development  loans  and financial  support  to the  banks.  The
liabilities  of BR are  currency  hold by the  public,  reserves  of the  banking
systm, forctd  investments  of the  banks in  development  funds,  long-term- 5.^ -
TABLE 10
SIMULATION: DIFFERENCES  FROW  BASE CASE
FISCAL CLOSURE
FORCED  INVESTMENT  CASE
(With  Exchange  Rat4  Adjustonet)
_  _-__tProjocted-------------
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
,OP  Croath Rate  000O  0.031  -0.111  -0.11  -0.111
Investment  Crowth  Rate  0.27#  -1.49#  -0.13%  -0.04%  -0.031
prfivate  1.26%  -0.01%  -0.151  -0O151  -0.15X
Publ ic  -1.631  -4.41t  -0.441  0.561  0.411
GDP per  capita  Crowth  Rate  0.001  0.02X  -011$  -0.11%  -0,111
Consumption  per  capita  growth  rate  -0.01  0.46X  -0.13X  -0.13X  -0.12S
arose  Invoetment/Gop  0.041  -0.261  -0.261  -0.261  -0.2611
Oe_*tic  Sevinge/COP  0.011  -0.32X  -0.31%  -0.29X  -0.261
National  Savings/GOP  0.01#  -0.30%  -0.291  -0.29S  -0.289
Marginal  National  Savings  Rite  0.49  -6.  991  -0.131  -0.11S  -0.07%
Private  Investment/Cop  0.111  0.13%  0.131  0.121  0.121
Private  Consumption/COP  -0.011  0.32S  0.31$  0.29%  0.231
Private  Savings/GOP  0.001  0.04%  0.03%  0.031  0.021
Private  Resource  Oolance/COP  -0.11X  -0.101  0.101  -O.1OS  -0.10#
Public  Investment/GOP  -0.11#  -0.401  -0.39#  -0.33%  -0.361
Public  Savings/WOP  0.01#  -0.34#  -0.33%  -0.31#  -0.301
Public  Rovenues/CDP  0.01x  0.001  OOCA  0.001  -0.001
Public  ExwPenditures/0OP  -0.111  -0.061  -0.061  -0.07S  -0.07%
Public  Oeficit/GOI1  -0.121  -0.061  -0.061  -0.07%  -0.071
MLT Extornal  Financing  -O.OO1  -0.011  -0.0CS  -0O00S  -0.00X
(External  Financing  availability)  -0.001  -0.011  -0.001  -0.001  -0.00O
ST External  Financing  0.00%  -0.001  0.00%  -O.OC  -0.00
Domestie  financing-financial  system  -0.111  -0.065  -0.06  -0.081  -0.0611e
From Sanco  do  Is  Rtublics  -1.69%  -0.361  -0.331  -0.361  -0.34X
Fro Roest  of  Financial  System  1.161  0.31%  0.291  0.29#  0.23%
oomestic  financing-private  sector  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
Residual  O.001  0.001  0.00S  0.001  0.001
Ral exchange  rate  inde1  0.16  0.62  0.50  0.53  0.16
Roel Exchange  Rate  Depreciation(-)  0.171  0.42%  -0.02S  0.04%  0.06%
Domestic Inflation  0.0011  0.00  0.00%  0.00#  0.001
Exchange  Rate DePreciation  -0.23X  -0.55%  0.031  -0.06#  -006l
Nominal  Interest  Rate  0.00111O  0,00%  000%  000%  0001
Real  Interest  Rite  0.001  0.00  0.0O  0.00%  0.00#
Loan  Rate  -3.531  -3.391  -3.25S  -3.11%  -2.97%
Real  Loan  Rate  -2.U31  -2.74X  -2.84%  -2556%  -2.461
Government  Interest  Rate  0.00o  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00#
Rate on  Forced  Investment  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00°
Foreed Investment  Ratio  -3.911  -3.96%  -3.9e%  -3.961  -3.961
Reservo ratio  -C.  S0  -5.S0O  -6580%  -6.80%  -6.S01
Stock  of  MI/CDP  0.00X  0.00%  0.00  0.001  0.001
Stock  of  Quasi-money/COP  0,001  0.01%  0.04%  0.06S  0.071
Stock  of  credit  to  private  sector/GDP  0.09%  0.16X  0.23%  0.291  0.331
Export  Crowth  Rate  -0.06X  -0.141  -0,03%  -0.065  -0.061
Growth rate  manufocturing  exports  -0.43X  -0.09%  -0.16%  -0.161
Exportx/GOP  -0.051  -0.17%  -0.16%  -0.15S  -0.165
mport  Croeth  Rate  0.141  -0101  -0.12X  -0.  09  -0.09#
Growth rate  intermediato  imports  0.  09  0.271  -0.  13%  -0.091  -001
Cro-th  rate  private  capital  imports  1.321  0.171  -0.161  -0.14S  -0.131
Croeth  rate  private  cons  imports  0.091  0.761  -0.16%  -0.11#  -0.101
Tom  Rate  on  Imports  0.00%  0.001  0.00%  0.001  0.001
Imports/clP  -0.011  -0.111  -0.111  -0.11#  -0.121
Current  Account  Deficlt  (in  US3mill)  13."  19.76  16.12  10.11  17.10
Current  Account  Deficit/GOP  0.0"3  0.04%  0.03X  0.03%  0.03X
Net  International  Reooerve  (USSmill)  7.11  1.61  -3.13  -6.62  -10.09
Net  Reserves  (in  months  Imorts)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Total  External  Det Ratio  -0.061  -0.271  -0.21X  -0.17%  -0.14t
Public  Debt  Ratio  -0.161  -0.37J  -0.34X  -0.341  -0.332foreign  loans,  and  ret other  liabilities. Domestic  credit  to the  government
is the residual  variable  just  as in the  basic  model.
87.  The rest  of the  banking  system  holds (as  assets)  credit  to the
private  and public  sectors,  as  well as reserves  and forced  inve3tments  at BR.
Its  liabilities  are  demand  deposits,  quasi-money,  short-term  and long-term
foreign  loans,  credit  from  BR,  and  net  other  liabilities.  As with the  central
bank,  credit  to the  public  sector  is the  residual  item.
88.  With this  extension  of the  model,  we also  need to add  an equation
that  determines  the  loan interest  rate.  The  deposit  interest  rate is set  as a
target  in real  terms,  as before. However,  the  loan interest  rate  will be
given  as the  deposit  interest  rate  plus  a spread  determined  by the reserve
ratio  and forced  investment  ratio,  as  well as by the  interest  rate received  by
the  banks  on forced  investments.
89.  The  policy  simulation  is to lower  the  ratio  of required  reserves  and
forced  investments. This lowers  the  loan  rate relative  to the  deposit  rate,
thus increasing  private  investment. It also  shifts  financing  (as  the  source
of loanable  funds)  from  the  central  bank to the  banking  system. Since  the
interest  rate  and inflation  target  are fixed,  BR  must offset  the  potential
expansionary  monetary  effects  by contracting  credit  to the  government
(relative  to  the  base  case). On  the  other  hand,  the  banking  system  can  lend
more  to  the  government  at  market  interest  rates,  since  it  sets  less  of  its
portfolio  aside  for  forced  investments  and  reserves  at  BR. Thus,  the  overall
effect  of  the  policy  change  is  to  substitute  domestic  debt  finance  of  the
government  for  money  finance,  which  raises  interest  expenditures  of  the
government  and  lowers  government  saving.- 56 -
90.  Table  10  shows  the  outcome  of  the  simulation.  The  lover  government
saving  forces  a reduction  of  public  investment  in  the  absence  of  other  fiscal
adjustment.  Private  investment  increases  in  response  to  the  lower  loan
interest  rate,  but  not  as  much  as  public  investment  falls.  The  rate  of  growth
is thus  slightly  lower  (by  about  .1  percentage  point).  As  with  the  other
policy  simulations,  this  incipient  fall  in  growth  (which  would  probably  be
offset  by  efficiency  improvements)  could  be  avoided  by  having  other  revenues
or  current  expenditures  adjust  to  compeniate  for  the  increased  interest  cost
of  domestic  debt. If  public  investment  is  indeed  the  locus  of  adjustment,
however,  the  financeable  deficit  is  also  reduced  slightly  by  the  lover  growth
rate. The  other  important  effect  of  this  policy  change  is  that  the  share  of
private  consumption  increases  because  of  the  reduction  in  the  inflation  tax  on
households.  Again,  the  simulation  does  not  capture  the  potential  gain  in
productivity  growth  induced  by  this  policy  reform.  There  are  several  sources
of  potential  productivity  gain. First,  the  reallocation  of  investment  toward
private  investment  away  from  public  investment,  given  that  the  former  has  a
higher  rate  of  return  than  the  latter.  Second,  the  rationalization  of  the
real  interest  rate  (making  it  equal  for  all  borrowers)  would  raise  the
efficiency  of  all  investments.  Finally,  the  greater  flexibility  bestowed  to
the  financial  sector  in  managing  their  assets  should  lead  to  a  more  efficient
financial  sector.
D.  Policy  Simulation  IV: Lovwering  Inflation
91.  The  final  policy  simulation  is  a reduction  in  inflation  to  102  by
1994  (ten  points  lower  than  the  base  case). This  requires  a reductlon  in  the
fiscal  deficit  of  1  percentage  poLit  of  CDP fron  the  bass  case  by  1994,  which- 57  -
TA2LU  11
SIWULATION:  DIFFERENCES  FROM BASE CASE
FISCAL  CLOSURE
LOWIR  INFLATION  CASE
(With  Exchange  Rate  Adjustment)
--------- Proj  ected…--------------------------
1900  1991  1992  1993  1994
GDP Growth  Rate  -0.00S  -0.02X  -0.11  -0.22S  -0.3SS
Investment  Growth  Rat-  -0.24S  -0.94X  -1.44X  -1.681  -1.32X
Pr;vat*  0.063  0.17!  0.11!  O.01X  -0 263
Public  -0.O%0  -3.0X  -4.023  -6.19!  -3.371
COP por  capita  Crowth  Rate  -0.001  -0.02%  -0.10X  -0.22X  -0.356
Consumption  per  capita growth  rate  0.023  0.07%  -0.03X  -0.12X  -0.292
Cross  Investment/COP  -0.04X  -0.20%  -0.42%  -0.67!  -0.34X
Domestic  Savings/COP  -0.02X  -0.09%  -0.16X  -0.24X  -0.231
National  Savings/COP  -0.02%  -0.10S  -0.1C1  -0.26X  -0.29S
Marginal  National  Savings  Rate  -0.993  -2.021  -2.63X  -3.390  -2.37!
Private  Investment/COP  0.01U  0.04X  0.09%  0.13X  0.15S
Private  Consumption/COP  0.023  0.091  0.165  0.24!  0.23f
Private  Savings/GDP  -0.031  -0.151  -0.25X  -0.32X  -0.3O  1
Private  Rsoeurce  Dalence/CDP  -0.04X  -0.19%  -0.33X  -0.4tS  -0.43!
Public  Investment/COP  -0.06!  -0.23  -0.61%  -0.301  -0.992
Public  Savings/CP  0.013  0.04%  0.06!1  0.060  0.03X
Public  Revenues/GOP  -0.00  -0.01%  -0.02%  -0.031  -0.043
Public  Expendituroes/C  -0.o07!  -0.301  -0.69%  -0.33!f  -1.07!
Publ;c  Deficit/COP  -0.060  -0.291  -0.57!  -O.9ao  -1.03X
WLT  External  Financing  0.0011  0  0.001  0.13  0.01%  0.02!
(External  Financing  availability)  O.0  0.00111  0.013  0.01;  0.021
ST  External  Financing  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001
Doe_stic  financing-financial  system  -0.0!S  -0.291  -0.57!  -0."U  -1.043
Free  lance  de Is  Republics  -0.013  -0.063  -0.113  -0.18!f  -0.24S
From  Rest  of  Financial  System  -O.06J  -0.24!  -0.46X  -0.691  -0.791
Dometic  financing-private  sector  -0.002  -0.001  -0.013  -0.01%  -0.013
Residual  0.001  0.00%  0.003  0.001  0.001
Real  exchange  rate  index  -0.09  -0.34  -0.75  -1.16  -1.32
Real  Exchange  Rate  Oepreciation(-)  -0.011  -0.29S  -0.6UA  -0.49X  -04231
Domestic  Inflation  -1.001  -4.001  -7.001  -10.00!  -11.001
Exchange  Rate  Depreciation  -0.913  -3.64X  -6.23X  -9.10S  -10.44X
Nominal  Interost  Rate  -1.051  -4.19%  -7.33X  -10.47X  -11.52!
Real Intereost  Rate  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.00%  0.001
Loon  Rate  -1.30X  -C.201  -9.103  -13.001  -14.301
Real  Loan  Rate  -0.143  -0.53!  -1.073  -1.691  -1.304
Covernment  Interest  Rate  -1.06!  -4.19%  -7.33!  -10.47X -11.52!
Rate  on  Forced  Investment  0.001  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.001
Forced  Investment  Ratio  0.001  0.0!  0.00!  0.003  0.0011
Reserve ratio  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.003  0.001
Stock  of  MI/COP  0.02X  0.031  0.16%  0.23X  0.26X
Stock  of  Quasi-money/COP  0.113  0.54%  1.29%  2.40%  3.5C9
Stock  of  credit  to  private  sector/CDP  0.22!  1.11S  2.64%  4.90!  7.343
Export  Growth  Rite  0.031  0.091  0.14X  0.10%  -0.02%
Crowth  rate  manufacturing  exports  0.10%  0.29%  0.43X  0.31X  -0.10%
Experts/  WG  0.03X  0.11S  0.211  0.41!  0.57%
Import  Growth  Rate  -0.091  -0.32X  -0.5  C  -0.71X  -0.64X
Crowth  rate  nter-ediate  imprts  -0.06!  -0.191  -0.39X  -0.501  -0.49L
Growth  rate  private  capital  imports  0.023  0.061  -0.11  -0.201  -O.86X
Growth  rate  private  come  imorto  -0.081  -0.063  -0.29'  -0.3C9  -0.41X
Tax Rate  on  Imports  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00°  0.001
Imports/COP  0.00  0.001  0.02%  0.021  0.013
Current  Account  Deficit  (in  USJ-ill)  -9.40  -41.24  -106.11  -193.61  -232.06
Current  Account  Deficit/GOP  -0.02#  -0.101  -0.24X  -0.40%  -0.5!
get  Internoti.al  Resrves  (USImill)  -4.00  -21.44  -C5.24  -100.30  -144.00
Net  Reserves  (in  months  l-prto)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Total  External  Deb  Ratio  0.041  0.191  0.421  0.671  0.6C
Public  Debt  Ratio  0.013  -0.001  -0.101  -0.331  -0.871- 58  -
implies  a small  surplus. It also requires  a small  amount  of additional  real
depreciation  (cumulatively  1.6  percentage  points).
92.  The decline  in inflation  implies  a drop in  monetary  financing  of the
public  deficit,  which is  what forces  the  deficit  reduction. There is  also a
drop in the  nominal  flow  of debt finance,  which reflects  the  lower  nominal
accumulation  of financial  assets  by the  private  sector  to  meet desired  real
stocks. This lower  financing  is  partially  offset  by higher  public  saving.
reflecting  lower  nominal  interest  costs.  Note that  part of the  drop in
financing  and  all  of the increase  in  saving  is illusory  in economic  terms.  It
would disappear  if  we adjusted  domestic  interest  payments  and  net  borrowing
for  inflation,  since  part  of the interest  payments  is implicit  amortization  to
compensate  for inflation.  However,  most of the  drop in the  deficit  is real,  so
that  public  investment  must be reduced  by 1 percentage  point  of GDP  by 1994 in
the absence  of other  measures  (Table  11).
93.  The reduction  in inflation  also raises  private  consumption  and lowers
private  saving. This is because  the inflation  tax on consumers  is reduced,
which raises  the  effective  disposable  income  of consumers  and  thus
consumption. However,  measured  private  saving  is reduced  since  the inflation
tax is  not formally  counted  in the  national  accounts. The reduced  inflation
also reduces  the  nominal  quantity  of  money  balances  accumulated  by consumers,
by even  more than the  reduction  in saving. This implies  a shift  toward
interest-bearing  assets,  both  domestic  and foreign  (although  nominal  domestic
quasi-money  demand  still  declines).  The  higher  capital  outflow  is  what leads
to the small  amount  of required  real  currency  depreciation  to accompany  the
inflation  reduction.- 59 -
94.  The  drop in inflation  indirectly  increases  private  investment. The
real loan  rate falls  even though  the  real  deposit  rate is  unchanged,  since
lower  inflation  implies  a lower  implicit  tax through  the reserve  and forced
investment  requirements  and a lower  spread. The  private  investment  increase
is  less  than the  drop in public  investment,  so growth  falls  slightly  from  the
base case.  As with the  other  scenarios,  if fiscal  adjLztment  was achieved
without reducing  public  investment,  the  drop in growth  could  be avoided  (and
even  reversed,  because  of  the  rise  in  private  investment). 18
95.  There  are  other  complications  not  captured  by  the  model. Inflation
inertia  often  exists  because  of  implicit  or  explicit  indexation  of  wage  and
financial  contracts.  Supply  shocks  can  have  an  important  effect  on  the  price
level,  which  will  change  measured  inflation  even  if  not  affecting  the  long  run
tendency.  However,  this  scenario  is  useful  to  highlight  the  macro
fundamentals  necessary  for  inflation  to  fall.
VI.  CONCLUSION
96.  Both  the  basic  and  extended  versions  of  the  model  prove  useful  to
evaluate  macroeconomic  polic-  trade-offs.  In  the  basic  version,  we  analyze
trade-offs  among  differe:Ct  targets  (real  exchange  rate,  inflation,  and  real
interest  rates),  with  the  fiscal  deficit  and  its  financing  composition  playing
the  adjusting  role. In  the  extended  model,  the  real  exchange  rate  also
18/  Another  policy  simulation  increasing  inflation  to  29?  by  1994  was  also
run  --  the  exchange  rate  depreciated  by  less  than  the  base  case,  and
the  public  deficit  was  higher  than  the  base  case  by .6S  of  GDP  in  1994.- 60 -
adjusts  in  order  to observe  the  constraint  on external  financing. With the
extended  model,  we determine  the  complementary  macro  adjustment  that  will  be
required  by structural  reforms  such  as  trade  and financial  liberalization.
The  model  shows  that  these  reforms  generally  require  reduction  of the fiscal
deficit. If this is done through  public  investment  cuts,  this  will have
negative  consequences  for  growth,  which  can  be avoided  by reducing  current
expenditures  or increasing  other  public  revenues. The model does  not
explicitly  incorporate  the  favorable  growth  effects  of trade  or financial
liberalization,  which  are  probably  enough  to offset  even a drop in  public
investment.
97.  This  model is  an attempt  to  combine  the  best of two  approaches. In
the  traditional  financial  programming  exercise,  there  is considerable
attention  to accounting  detail  but little  reflection  of how  economic  agents
behave.  In  behavioral  macro  models,  on the  other  hand,  many of the  accounting
niceties  are ignored  in favor  of aggregate  behavioral  relationships,  which
limits  their  usefulness  for  designing  a  macro  program.  Putting  some  minimum
of  behavior  into  a detailed  accounting  framework,  although  costly  to
implement,  is  a way to design  a  macro  program  to  be consistent  with both
economic  intuition  and  budgetary  and  monetary  accounts.- 61  -
Appendix  I
Technical  Implementation  of the  Model
I.  PROGRAMMING  OF MODEL  IN JAVELIN
The  Colombia  RMSM-X  model  was implemented  in  Javelin  by modifying  to
suit  the  Colombian  economy  the  existing  RMSM-X  shell  developed  by John  Holsen,
Ali  Khadr,  Klaus  S^hmidt-Hebbel,  and  Jaume  Ventura.
As  mentioned  in the  main  body of the  paper,  there  are  three  methods
used to project  the  variables  in the  model;  exogenously,  by econometric
estimation,  or by specifying  the  variable  as a share  to  GDP that  is  assumed  to
remain  constant  over  the  projection  period.
A. Calculation  of Coefficient  From Base  Period
The  nomenclature  of the  model  specifies  that  assumptions  for
projected  variables  are  named  with a 'z'  prefix.  The  base period  coefficients
are calculated  as  follows  in Javelin:
Taking  Direct  Taxes,  Td, as an example,  the formula  would  be
z Td ZGDP  *  VALUE(Td/GDP,[1988])
This  yields  the  Ratio  to GDP  of Direct  Taxes  in 1988;  the  ratio  is
then  applied  to exogenously  projected  GDP to obtain  projected  Direct  Taxes  as
follows:
Td - z Td ZGDP*GDP
Many of the  interest  rates  of the  external  sector  in the  model  are
calculated  using  averages  of  historical  data.  The interest  rates  on external
debt are related  to the  LIBOR.  and the  interest  rate  spread  is calculated
directly  in the  formula.  For example,  the  interest  rate  or,  external  debt  of
the  public  sector  has been  calculated  as  follows:
z Dol INT8f  a  z Dol  INTLibor  +  VALUE((TSUH(BEGIN(:1987],Dol  Ngf,2))/
TSUM(BEGIN((1986],Stk  Dol  Lfg,2)))  - z  Dol INTLibor,[1988])
The above  expression  calculates  the  1988  value  of the interest  rate
the government  paid to the  external  sector.  This interest  rate  is an average
of  the  interest  paid in 1987  and  1988  on the  stock  of external  debt in 1986
and 1987.  The  LIBOR rate  in 1968  is then subtracted  from  this  average  interest
rate to  obtain  the  spread  between  the  two rates  in 1988;  this  spread  is then
assumed  to  hold for  the  entire  projection  period,  and  the  government's  rate  on
external  debt  moves  with LIBOR. Other  interest  rates  to  which similar
versions  of this formula  were applied '.nclude  interest  on reserves,  and the
rate  on short  term  external  debt  of the  private  sector.- 62 -
Variables  which  were projected  as constant  ratios  to GDP or releva-t
activity  variables:
z OFIProfRate  Profits  as a  share  of previous  stock  of direct
foreign  investment
z DomCapGgZGDP  Public  domestic  use  of capital  goods (in  private
closure)
z DomCp  GDP  Private  domestic  use  of consumer  goods
z  DomCp  YD  Private  domestic  use  of consumer  goods  as a ratio
to disposable  income
z DRS ZGDP  Depreciation,  interest  and retained  earnings  of
the  other  public  sector
z Imp  Cg  Public  imports  of consumer  goods  as a share  of
public  consumption
z Imp  DomCapGg  Public  imports  of capital  goods  as a share  of
public  domestic  use  of capital  goods
z ImpSharelnv  Imports  of capital  goods  share  of total
investment
z Lgp ZGDP  Credit  from  public  to private  sector
z Lmg ZGDP  Credit  from  financial  to  public  sector  (in
private  closure)
z Lmp :Ip  Credit  from  financial  to  private  sector  (in
fiscal  closure)
z  LpgZQM  Credit  from  private  sector  to government  as ratio
to quasi-money  (in  fiscal  closure)
z Months  Sck  NetIntlRes  Stock  of Reserves  in  months  iiports  (in  fiscal
closure)
z  tk NOL ZQM  Net  Other  Liabilities  of financial  sector  as
ratio  to quasi-money
z NOLS ZGDP  Net  Other  Liabilities  of government
z OthR ZGDP  Other  revenues  of public  sector
z Subg 2GDP  Government  subsidies
z Td ZGDP  Direct  Taxes
z Tgp ZGDP  Government  transfers  to private  sector
z Ti.imp  ZImp  Import  taxes  as share  of imports  (goes  into
calculating  indirect  taxes)
z Ti.prod  ZGDP  Product  taxes  (goes  into  calculating  indirect
taxes)
9. Implementation  of Closure  Rule in  Javelin
The closure  rule is implemented  by specifying  a variable  called
Closure,  which  will be set to  either  'private'  or 'fiscal'. A  series  of IF
statements  are  then input  in formulas  for  certain  key  variables  in the  model.
These  IF statements  take the  form  of
Lm8g  IF(Closure-'private',Stk  Lmg-PREVIOUS(Stk  Lmg),TotFinCapS-Lmp-NFAc-
NFAof-NFAd)
?aking  domestic  government  debt to the financial  system  as  an
example,  it  can  be  seen  that  in  the  private  closure,  the  flow  is  calculated
simply  as tho  change  in the stock,  while in the  fiscal  closure,  Lmg is the- 63 -
residual  variable  for  the  financial  system.  In th'i  case there  is another  IF
statement  in the  equation  for  stock  of Lmg as follows:
Stk  Lmg a  IF(Closurea'private',z  Img ZGDP*G:P,BEIN((1989],?.REVIOUS(Stk
Lmg)+Lmg))
Thus,  if the  private  closure  is chosen,  Lwa  is  projected  as a
constant  ratio  to GDP throughout  the  projection  period;  otherwise,  in the
fiscal  closure  Lmg is a residual  variable,  and the  current  stock  of Lmg  is
calculated  by adding  the flow  in the  current  period  to the  stock  of the
previous  period.
Variables  for  which IF statements  were  specified;
Dol  Knei  Capital  nei
Dol  Lfg  External  financing  of government  debt
Dol  NFAcb  Reserves
Dom CapG g  Public  expenditure  on domestic  capital  goods
Dom  Cp  Private  consumption  of domestic  goods
K  Dom  Cp  Private  domestic  consumption  1988  prices
Lmg  Monetary  financing  of government  debt
Lmp  Financial  sector  credit  to  private  sector
Lpg  Private  sector  financing  of government  debt
Stk  Dol  NFAcb  Stock  of  reserves
Stk  Lmg  Stock  of Lmg
Stk  Lmp  Stock  of Lmp
Stk Lpg  Stock  of Lpg
z  Months  Stk  NetlntlRes  Stock  of reserves  in  months  of imports
C.  How the  Model is Specified  so as to be Solved  Recursively
With the inclusion  of behavioral  equations  into  RMSM-X,  simultaneity
is created. Certain  variables  had to be specified  differently  to allow
Javelin  to solve  the  model recursively. This  did  not impact  on the  solution
of the  model;  the solution  is in effect  simultaneous,  because  the  model is
implicitly  solving  for  the reduced  form  for these  variables.
One source  of circularity  in the  private  closure  is private
consumption,  which  was specified  as the  residual  in the  National  Accounts.
This procedure  created  a circularity  within  the  model  when the  behavioral
equations  were entered,  because  imports,  which  help  determine  private
consumption,  were also  dependent  upon  private  consumption.  To resolve  this
programming  circularity,  private  imports  of censumption  goods  were excluded
from  both sides  of the  equation,  and  domestic  private  consumption  then  became
the residual  variable.  Private  imports  of consumption  goods  were  made
dependent  upon the  real  exchange  rate  and domestic  private  consumption  instead
of total  private  consumption. This  practice  does  not change  the  solution,  as
long  as the  share  of private  consumption  imports  in domestic  private
consumption  remains  constant  throughout  the  projection  period. This is
because  the  model is implicitly  solving  for  the  reduced  form  for  these
variables.- 64
A similar  situation  exists  in  the  fiscal  closure.  Public  investment
was  to  be  the  residual  variable  for  the  national  accounts,  but  Imports,  which
partly  determine  public  investment,  at  the  same  time  depend  on  investment.
Again,  this  problem  was  resolved  by  excluding  from  the  identity  public  Lmports
of  capital  goods.  Domestic  use  of  capital  goods  by  the  public  sector  became
the  residual,  and  now  private  Imports  of  capital  goods  are  determined  by  the
real  exchange  rate  and  private  investment.
Another  source  of  simultaneity  which  applies  to  both  closures  is  the
relationship  between  imports,  private  consumption,  and  disposable  income.
Imports  turn  out  to  be  partly  determined  by  variables  which  are  in  turn
dependent  upon  imports.  Tmports  are  determined  by  private  consumption,  which
depends  upon  disposable  income,  which  is  partly  determined  by  indirect  taxes,
which  are  calculated  by  using  imports.  Adjusted  disposable  income  was  defined
in  order  to  circumvent  this  problem.  This  new  variable  excludes  taxes  on
private  consumption  imports  as  well  as  government  imports  from  its  calculation
of  indirect  taxes.  Now  private  consumption  imports  depend  on  adjusted
disposable  income,  and  adjusted  disposable  income  is  no longer  determined  by
imports  of  consumer  goods.  Again,  this  is  equivalent  to  solving  for  the
reduced  form  of  consumption  as  a function  of  variables  outside  the
simultaneous  system.  However,  the  share  of  private  domestic  consumption  in
adjusted  disposable  income  should  include  the  effe  t  of  taxes  on  consumption
imports.  In  the  model  this  share  is  constant,  and  therefore  does  not  capture
the  effect  of  changis  in  consumption  '"J_rt  taxes  on  private  domestic
consumption.  However  it  is  expected  t 4t  this  offoct  will  be  very  small,  so
its  exclusion  does  not  present  a  major  jroblem  to  the  model.
Adjusted  disposable  income  also  excludes  the  inflationary  component
of  interest  on  the  government  deficit.  This  is  a  behavioral  assumption  --
that  the  private  sector  treats  the  inflationary  component  of  interest  as
implicit  amortizat'.on  rather  than  as  income.
II.  ESTIMATION  OF UNDERLYING  PARAMETERS  OF THE  MODEL
A.  Regression  Results  for  MoneZ  Demand  and  Quasi-Money
Estimations  for  money  demand  and  quasi-money  ware  performed  in  TSP  on
data  with  a sample  range  of  1966  to  1988  for  money  demand  and  1972  to  1988  for
quasi-money.  For  money  demand,  GDP  and  the  average  inflation  rate  were  found
to  be  significant,  with  a  correction  for  autocorrelation.  The  nominal
interest  rate  vas  substituted  for  the  inflation  rate,  but  was  not  found  to  be
significant.  The  real  interest  rate  and  GDP  were  found  to  be  significant  in
determining  quasi-money.  Coefficients  for  inflation  in  money  demand  and  the
real  interest  rate  in  quasi-money  were  used  in  the  behavioral  equations  in
RMSH-X. For  quasimoney  estimations,  GDP  is  a  proxy  for  wealth. In  the
extended  version,  qt~asimonsy  is  tied  to  wealth  as  opposed  to  nominal  GDP  in
the  basic  model.
Bocause  the  series  are  likely  to  be  cointegrated,  in  the  extended
model  new  regressions  were  run  using  money  and  quasimoney  ratios  to  GDP. The
same  relationships  were  found  to  exist  as  in  the  previous  regressions;  that
is.  average  inflation  is  significant  in  determining  the  ratio  of  money  to  GDP,
and  the  ratio  of  quasimoney  to  GDP  is  significantly  deterained  by  the  real
interest  rate._ 65  -
B.  IL,Port  and  export  elasticities
In the  original  version  of the  model,  price  elasticities  for  various
categories  of imports  and  exports  were obtained  from  the  Colombia  CEM of  April
21, 1989,  and from  the  Colombia  Division. These  are  the  same  elasticities
used for  the  previous  version  of the  RMSM in the  Colombia  division.
Estimations  were performed  on volumes  of  manufacturing  and other  exports,  and
consumer,  capital  goods,  and intermediate  imports. Both types  of exports  are
determined  by the  real  exchange  rate  and  GDP.  All imports  are  functions  of
the  real  exchange  rate.  Private  imports  of capital  goods  are a function  of
private  investment,  private  imports  of consumer  goods  are  a function  of
private  domestic  consumption,  and imports  of raw  materials  and intermediaries
are  a function  of GDP.
In the  extended  version  of the  model,  new regressions  were run  in
SOPITEC  for import  and  export  demand  using  the  variables'  ratios  to  GDP. as
was done  with money  and  quasimoney  demand,  since  import  and  export  variables
are presumed  to  be cointegrated  with GDP.  All imports'  sample  range  was
1970-1988;  for  exports  it  vas 1965-1988. After  correcting  for
autocorrelation,  the real  exchange  rate  was found  to be  significant  in
determining  imports  of rav  materials  and intermediaries  and  exports  of
manufactures  at the  102 level. The  same  relationship  existed  for  other
categories  of imports  and  exports,  although  not  as significantly.
Nevertheless,  the  elasticities  were  used in the  model,  since  these  represent
a best available  estimates. 19
C.  Parameterization  to obtain  vwell-beaved  model  solution
In order  to obtain  reasonable  simulation  :csults,  the  elasticity  of
private  Livestment  vith respect  to the real  loan rate  vas set  equal  to -. 5 in
the  model  after  experimenting  with different  values. Econometric  estimates  of
this  parameter  were inconclusive.  The inrome  elasticity  o..  private  in'estment
demand  was set to 1.
III.  PROGRAMMING  oF THE  EXCHANGE  RATE  RULE
Implementing  Exchanie  Rate  Adjustment  in Javelin
In the  original  version  of the  model,  real  exchange  rate  appreciation
or depreciation  was exogenous. In the  extended  model the  sal exchange  rate
becomes  the  adjusting  variable  vhen public  sector  foreign  borrowing  is
constrained  to be consistent  vith the  available  exter!al  credit  supply. To
solve  for  the  appropriate  devaluation  rate,  the  model  goes through  three
iterations  each  projection  year.  The first  two Lterations  are required  tv
calculate  the  relationship  between  the  size  of the  gapfil  --  the  gap between
available  external  fPnancing  and  public  sector  foreign  borrowing  --  and
devaluation,  which in this  case turns  out  to be linear. In the  third
iteration  this relationship  is used to calculate  the  appropriate  devaluation
rate,  which is then  applied  to the  model  for  that  particular  year.
19/  It should  bt  ed that simulation  results  are sensitive  to parameter
estimtes  from these  regressions,  since  these  estimates  go directly
into  the  model._ 66 -
Defining  Nov  Variables
To implement  the  exchange  rate  algorithm,  the following  changes  and
additions  "are made:
*  Real  exchange  rate  depreciation  (z (ExRRGR)  is redefined:
z ExRRGR  - z ExRRGR  iterative  +  delta  ExRRGR
where  delta  ExRRGR  is the  increment  by which  the  exchange  rate
is devalued  in each iteration,  and z ExRRGR  iterative  is
z ExUGR  in the  previous  iteration.
*  Dol Lfg  Gapfil  is  the  difference  between  available  external
financing  and  public  sector  foreign  borrowing.
*  Gapfil  Last is  Dol Lfg  Gapfil  in the  previous  iteration.
*  d ExRRGR  a  -(Gapfil  Last/alpha)
i  alpha  - (Dol  Lfg  Gapfil-Gipfil  Last)/delta  ExRRGR
The  Macro
The  exchange  rate  macro consists  of a series  of  macros  written for
each year  which  wi'l define  the  setting  of the  model to that year,  then go
through  the  three  iterations. The first  iteration  applies  an arbitrary
devaluation  rate  of .5Z  then  copies  over the  calculated  Dal  Lfg Gapfil  to
Galfil  Last,  and z ExUGR  over to z LsRGR  iterative. The  model  then goes
through  the second  iteration,  which  yields  the  new  Dol Lfg  Gapfil,  so that
alpha  and  d ExRGR  are  now calculated. In the  third  iteration,  d ExRRGR,
which is the appropriate  devaluation  rate  is copied  over to delta  ExRRGR,  and
the  model is solved. This solution  process  reduces  the  gapfil  to less  than
.00025  percent  of GDP.- 67 -
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VARIABLE  CCEFFT-c::;:  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
C  2.9047133  3.0486364  0.9527910  0.353
AVEINFL  -0.3045083  0.1410502  -2.1588657  0.044
LGDP  0.6335572  0.2305463  2.7480693  0.013
AR(1)  0.7695571  0.1676160  4.5911917  0.000
R-squared  0.973825  Mean of dependent  var  11.03738
Adjusted R-squared  0.969692  S.D. of dependent var  0.243088
S.E. of regression  0.042320  Sum of squared resid  0.034028
Durbin-Watson stat  2.103430  F-statistic  235.6271
Log likelihood  42.29915
LS // Dependent Variable  is LQMCPD
Date: 2-02-1990 /  Time: 12:35
SMPL range: 1972  1988
Number of observations: 17
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
C  -21.304437  2.1811149  -9.7676822  0.000
RLR3  2.2556404  0.4852402  4.6485031  0.000
LGDP  2.4094979  0.1670710  14.422002  0.000
R-squared  0.975850  Mean of dependent var  10.38894
Adjusted R-squared  0.972400  S.D. of dependent var  0.599062
S.E. of regression  0.099524  Sum of squared resid  0.138672
Durbin-Watson stat  1.555003  F-statistic  282.8500
Log likelihood  16,75335
- _  _  _  . _  _  ___- 68  -
LS //  Dependent  Variable  is LS1C
Date:  2-02-1990  / Time:  12:33
SMPL range:  1966  - 1988
Number  of observations:  23
Convergence  achieved  after  7 iterations
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIC.
C  -2.2483145  1.5343875  -1.4652847  0.158
AVEINFL  -0.2897924  0.1379396  -2.1008651  0.049
,......  .................  ..  ..  .....  .........  ..........................  ............
AR(1)  0.9771435  0.1314224  7.4351343  0.000
R-squared  0.790959  Mean of dependent  var  -1.934627
Adjusted  R-squared  0.770055  S.D.  of dependent  var  0.095517
S.E. of regression  0.045803  Sum  of squared  resid  0.041958
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.104275  F-statistic  37.83760
Log likelihood  39.89006
LS  // Dependent  Variable  is L4MC
Date:  2-02-1990  / Time: 12:33
SMPL range:  1973  - 1988
Number  of observations:  16
Convergence  achieved  after 3 iterations
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  -2.4395555  0.2673102  -9.1263090  0.000
RLR3  1.4319982  0.6488352  2.2070291  0.046
. ...................................................................
AR(1)  0.8499039  0.0876740  9.6939057  0.000
R-squared  0.919953  Mean of dependent  var  -2.686052
Adjusted  R-squared  0.907638  S.D.  of dependent  var  0.375226
S.E.  of regression  0.114036  Sum  of squared  resid  0.169054
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.895396  F-statistic  74.70189
Log  likelihood  13.69799- 69  -
Estimations  of import  and  export  volume  for  Colombia  RMSM-X
IMPORTS  Source:  Colombia  Division
Consumer  CVt  - -0.372*(-RERt)  +  0.984*(CPt)
Intermediate  IVt  a  -0.226*(-RERt)  +  0.705*(GDPt)  + 0.479*(IVti1)
Capital  KVt  - -0.509*(-RERt)  +  0.668*(FKt)  +  0.363*(KVtl)
Where  variables  are  in  changes,  except  otherwise  indicated
CV  - Volume  of  consumer  goods  imports
CP  - Real  growth  in  private  consumption
IV  - Volume  of  raw  materials  and  intermediate  goods  imports
KV  - Volume  of  capital  goods  Imports
GDP  - GOP
FK  - Change  in  real  levels  of  total  fixed  investment
RER  - Real  exchange  rate  change
(Domestic  Price  Index/Exchange  Rate*World  Price  Index)
EXPORTS  Source:  CEM,  April  21,  1989.
Manufactures  XMAMU  * -8.890  +  0.789*RPX  +  1.425*CAPV
(1.96)  (4.94)
XMANU  - Export  supply  of  manufactured  goods  and  constant  dollar  prices.
RPX  - Ratio  of  price  of  manufactured  export  goods  in  dollar  terms  to  home  good
prices  in  dollar  terms,  which  are  defined  as  industrial  wage  index.
CAPV  - Capacity  variable,  constructed  as  the  fitted  value  of  the  following
regression  :
LSCALE  - ao  +  a 1 * LSCALE(-1)  + a2 *  LRPMANPH(-1)  + e
where  LSCALE  is  the  value  added  in  the  manufactures  sector  at  constant
prices;  and
LRPMANPH  is  the  ratio  of  the  price  of  manufactured  goods  to  domestic  goods
Other  XOTn  * -10.41  - 0.715*RPX  +  1.190*CAPV
(1.55)  (5.15)
XOTM  - Exports  of  menores  minus  manufactured  exports  as  defined  by  Colombia's
central  bank.  Deflated  by  the  World  MUV.
RPX  - Industrial  real  wages  denominated  in  dollars.
CAPV - Capacity  variable,  constructed  in the same  manner  as CAPV in the
manufactures  regression,  substituting  LPMAN  for  LRPMANPH,  defined  as  follows:
LSCALE  is  real  GDP  and  LPMAN  is  the  ratio  of  domestic  prices  to
manufactured  goods  prices.- 70  -
SOC!TEC  PCDOS  400796
6.4.003  RMSHX  TRADE  REGS
(C)  1988  SG!
......................................................  ....................................................................................
CORC :  dependent  variable  is LMCAPC
using  1971  *  1987
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
^C0NSt  I  *5.06982  1.82830  *.7729  10.014
LREEN  |  0.435335  0 387663  1.12297  0.279
.RIR  0!  593149  0.195264 !  3.03768  0.008
....-  - - .-  -- -----  Equjtion  Summary  .-.--.-.-. *-----
No.  of Observations  *  17  U2  0.5344  (dj)s  0.5034
Sun  of Sq. Rlsid.  *  0.335657  Std.  Error  of  Reg.x  0.149590
Log(likelihood)  *  9.23951  Ourbin-Watson  *  1.47945
Sch  warz  Criterion  *  6.40630  F (  1  15)  *  17.2169
Akaike  Criterion a  7.23951  Significance  *  0.000856
-- -.-...  .Autocorrelation  Estimation  Summary  ................
Initial  Rho(1)  *  0.00000  Final  Rho(l)  a  0.59315
Std  Error  of RhoCi)  a  0.19526  t-value  (sig)  *  3.038  (0.008)
R-Squared  based  on transforwd (differenced)  model  *  0.23814
Convergenco  at iteration  4
SOITEC  jPCDO  4007%
6.4.003  RSINE  TRADE  RIEGS
(C) 19U  Sl  If
CORC :  depenJent  variable  is  LMCONC
using  1971  - 1987
Variable  Coefficient  Std Err  T-stat  Signf
^CONST  -6.70702  2  23417  *3.00202  0  009
LREER  0  561831  0  73734  1.18596  0.254
^RtW  !  N594NS  0.195028  3.04810  0.008
. .......  ....  ----------  -- Equation  Suimry .*-.---.-----.
No. of Obeervationw  *  17  R12  0.5014  (adi)- 0.4682
Sum of Sq. Resid.  *  0.500684  Std.  Error  of Re9..  0.182699
Log(lik.1ihood)  5.84048  Ourbin-Watson  *  .54030
Schwarz  Criterion  a  3.002  F (  1,  15)  *  15.08t1
Akaike  Criterion *  3.84048  Significance  *  0.U0146
- --  .Autocorrelttion  Estimation  Summary  . -.-.  ----.
Initial  tho(i)  *  0.00000  Final  Rhot1)  *  0.5944?
Std  Error  of  tho(l)  a  0.19503  t-volue  (sig)  *  3.048  (0.008)
-Sq  ared  based  on tron foeomd  (differanced)  modl  *  0.22036
Conv rgere  at Iteration  3
2- 7.  -
SORITEC  PCOOS  400796
6.4.003  RMSNX  TRADE  REGS
CC)  1988  SG!
...............................................................................
COZC  :  dependent  variable  is  LMRMIC
Using  1971  - 1987
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
......  ...  _  I..............  ..............  ......
COUST  - 2304?  !  1.43164  3.68837  0  002
LREtR  0.573269  0.303921  1.88624  0.079
^AHO  !  0-634466  !  0.187468  3  38440  O.OU4
.....  .-..  Equation  Summr  .......................
No.  of  Observations  a  17  R2x 0.6006  (adj).  0.5740
Sue  of  Sq.  Rfisd.  *  0.197615  Std.  Error  of  Reg.-  0.114779
Log(likelihood)  *  13.7426  Durbin-Watson  *  2.08839
Schwarz  Criterion  *  10.9094  F  C  1,  15)  *  22.5545
Akaike  Criterion  a  11.7426  Significance  a  0.000258
- . Autocorrelation  Estimation  Summary  ................
InitiaL  RhoCl)  a  0.00000  Final  RhoCl)  *  0.63447
Std  ErrJr  of  Rho(l)  a  0.18747  t-value  (sig)  *  3.384  (0.004)
I-Squsred  based on  transformed  (difTerenced)  modet *  0.30752
Convergenco  at  iteration  3
$MITIC  PCDOS  400796
6.4.003  NU(E TRADE  UEGS
;  1906 Ilat
ORC  :  depndnt variabte  is  LXMFGC
Using  1966  1987
Veriable  I  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
COhST  |  11.2406'9  267308  0  .4641341  0.648
LREER  *1.0761;  0  563600  -1.90946  0.071
LIfER  I 00.595799 !  0:171229  ! 3 47955 !  0.002
..........-.-  - -Equation  Suimary  ......................
No.  of  Oxservations *  22  R2a 0.5390 (adj)s  0.5160
Sun  of  Sq.  loeIdc  *  1.03489  Stc.  Error  of  Reg..  0.227475
Log(likelihood)  *  2.40753  Durbin-Watson  *  1.57429
Schwarz  Criterion  *  -0.683514  F  (  1,  20)  a  23.3882
Akaike Critorion  a  0.407528  Significance  *  0.000100
--  --  - --  .Autoeorrelation  Estimation  Sum_ry .-.
Initial  Rhocl)  *  0.00000  Final  RhoCl)  a  0.59580
Std  Error  of  Rho(l)  *  0.17123  t-value  (sig)  *  3.480  C0.002)
R-Siqueed  based on transformed  (differanced)  model  a  0.29124
Cwerge ne at  Iteration  a- 72 -
Variable  list  for  Estimations
Variable  Description  Source
AVEINFL  CPI  Inflation  IFS
LGDP  Log  of  GDP  Derived
LMlCPD  Log  of  Ml  deflated  by  Priv  Cons  Deflator  Derived
LM1C  L'1CPD-LGDP  Der1ved
LMCAP  Log  of  Imports  of  Capital  Goods  Derived
LMCAPC  LMCAP-LGDP  Derived
LMCON  Log  of Imports  of  Consumer  Goods  Devlved
LMCONC  LMCON-LGDP  Derived
LMRMI  Log  of Imports  of  Raw  Mat.&Intermediates  Derived
LMRMIC  LMRMI-LGOP  Delved
LQMCPD  Log  of  Quasi-Money/Priv  Cons  Defl.  Derived
LQMC  LQMCPD-LGDP  Derived
LREER  Log of  the  Real Exchange Rate  Deived
LXMFG  Log of  Exports  of  Manufactures  Derlved
LXMFGC  LXMFG-LGDP  Derlved
RLR3  Real  Interest  Rate (1.INTRAT)/(I+CPDYTY)  Derived
Variables  from  which  above  variables  were  derived
CPD)  Private  Consumption  Deflator  CN
CPDYTY)  Change  in  Priv.  Cons  Defl.  Derved
INTRAT  Nominal  Interest  Rate  levlsta
GOP)  Gross  Domestic  Product  CN
Ml)  Money  Revista,CEM
MCAP)  Imports  of  Capital  Goods  Colombia  Div.
(MCON)  Imports  of  Consumer  Goods  Colombia  Div.
(MRMI)  Imports  of  Raw  Mat.&Intermediates  Colombia  Div.
(REER)  Real  Exchange  Rate  CECMG  database
(XMFG)  Exports  of  Manufactures  BESD-IECTRO
(QM)  Quasi-Money  Revista,CEM
BESD-IECTRO  :  Bank  Economic  and  Social  Database,  International  Economics,  Trade
CN :  Cuentas  Nacionales  de Colombia
IFS :  International  Financial  Statistics
CEM  :  Country  Economic  Memorandum  (April  21,1989)
Revista:  Revista  del  Banco  de  la  Republica  (various  years)- 73 -
Appendix  II
Simulations  of the  Private  Sector  Closure
In order  to see  how the  model  behaves  differently  when  we change  from
the fiscal  to the  private  closure  described  in section  II of the  paper,  we
perform  the same  three  alternative  simulations  done in the  main text  of the
paper.  To recap  briefly  the  working  of the  model  under  the  private  closure.
the  public  sector  accounts  are  exogenously  projected  as constant  ratios  to
GDP.  The  only exception  are taxes  and interest  payments. Taxes  include  one
component  that is  projected  as a ratio  to imports  (trade  taxes). Interest
payments  are calculated  as last  period's  debt stock  times  the  current  appli-
cable  interest  rate.  In any  case,  the  public  sector  deficit  is determined
*above  the linew  rather  than  by financing  availability.
The  current  account  of the  balance  of payments  is projected  on the
basis  of exogenous  comodity developments  and  the  behavioral  response  to the
real exchange  rate,  just as in  the fiscal  closure. Net  disbursements  of
foreign  debt  and direct  foreign  investment  are  projected  exogenously.  and  the
change  in foreign  exchange  reserves  is the residual  for  the  balance  of
payments.
Private  investment,  money  demand,  and  quasi-money  demand  are  given  by
behavioral  equations,  just  as  in the fiscal  closure. However,  private
consumption  (and  saving)  is  given  as the residual  to balance  the  national
accounts  identity  instead  of being  determined  as a ratio  to disposable  income.
The stock  of credit  from  the financial  systm  to the  public  sector  is given  as
a  fixed  zatio  to GDP; credit  to the  private  sector  is the  residual  for  the
financial  system. To reconcile  the  projected  "above  the lines  fiscal  deficit
with financing  availability,  the  private  sector  is  assumed  to accumulate
enough  new  government  debt to fill  the  public  financing  gap.
We first  solve  the  model for  the  base  case for  the  private  closure,
as shown  in Table  A2.1.  We then solve  the  model for  the three  alternate  cases
in  which a target  variable  changes  and consider  the  differences  between  the
base case and the  alternative  solutions.
A.  Real Exchange  Rate  Appreciation
Table  A2.2 shows  the  differences  from the  base case for  a real
exchange  rate  appreciation  of 1.8S  per  year beginning  in 1990.  with a cumu-
lative  real  appreciation  of 11?  by 1995.  The appreciation  increases  the
zurrent  account  deficit  by 0.8  percentage  points  of GDP by  the  end of the
period  as import  volume  rises  and export  volums  falls. SLnce  external
financing  flows  are  unchanged,  this  results  in a cumlative loss  of reserves
of $2.3  billion  by 1995  compared  to the  base  case and a  decline  in import
coverage  from 7.3  months  to 4.6  months.
Unlike  the fiscal  closure,  the  public  deficit  changes  very little  as
a result  of real appreciation  under  the  fiscal  closure. Fiscal  revenues  drop
slightly  because  of the  valuation  effect  of real  appreciation  on income  from
trade  taxes.  Current  expenditures  fall  somewhat  more because  of the lower74
real  value of external  interest  payments.  t'i  ..  estment  as a ratio  to  GDP
is  unchanged  because  it  is projected exogenoi.zis  i'he  external financing  of
the  public  deficit  decreases  by somewhat  more than the  fall  in  the  deficit
because  of the lower  domestic  currency  value  of the  projected  dollar  net
disbursements  to the  public  sector. This  means that private  accumulation  of
government  debt  must rise  slightly  to fill  the  gap.
Private  investment  does fall  slightly  for the  same reason  as in the
fiscal  closure,  the fall  in the relative  price  of capital  goods  due to their
high import  content.  Since  all  of the  other  components  of GDP do not change
very much,  private  consumption  must increase  strongly  (and  private  saving
fall)  in response  to the  increase  in the  current  account  deficit. The
increase  in private  consumption  is financed  by credit  from  the financial
system,  which in turn is financed  by the running  down of foreign  exchange
reserves  held by the financial  system.
The  economic  story  behind  of this simulation  is that  of a real
exchange  rate appreciation  induced  by a credit-financed  private  consumption
boom.  This is a possible  outcome,  but the  model itself  does  not tell  us why
private  consumption  should  be booming.
B. Increase  in the  Real Interest  Rate
Table  A2.3 shows  the  differences  in key  variables  from  the  base case
when the real  interest  rate is increased  by 7.3  percentage  points  after  1990.
Unlike  the  previous  simulation,  the  effect  on the  current  account  is
negligible,  coming  out only  because  of the  drop in  private  investment--and
thus  capital  goods  imports--induced  by the  higher  real interest  rates.
However,  the  public  deficit  now increases  strongly  because  of the
higher  real  interest  rate.  Unlike  the  fiscal  closure,  this results  not from
increased  financing  availability  but from  changes  in the fiscal  accounts
"above  the line". The  higher  interest  rates  increase  government  interest
costs  on its  domestic  debt.  The  higher  deficit  must be financed  by issuing
more domestic  debt to the  private  sector  (recall  that  this is the  residual  for
the  private  closure). The  higher  debt in turn leads  to more interest
spending.  A  domestic  debt spiral  is underway,  fueled  by a real  domestic
interest  rate (102)  that far  exceeds  the  growth  rate (4Z).
The fall  in private  investment  is  not sufficient  to  compensate  for
the increase  in the  public  deficit,  so private  saving  also  must increase,
However,  increased  interest  on domestic  government  debt raises  the  private
sector's  disposable  income,  so that  private  consumption  can also increase.
The increase  in  private  saving  and fall in  private  investment  make possible
the accumulation  of domestic  government  debt.  The  higher  interest  rate
induces  more private  holding  of quasi-money  and other  liabilities  of the
financial  system. Credit  to the  private  sector  inc:eases  by an offsetting
amount,  since  this is the residual  for  the financial  system. The effect  of
higher interest  rates  on the  financial  system  is therefore  a neutral
financial  deepening'.
The  economic  story  for this  simulation  would  be that a boomlet  in
private  consumption  raises  real interest  rates,  which increases  the  government
deficit  and leads  to a public  domestic  debt spiral,  which at the  same  time
crowds  out  private  invostment. Again,  the  model  does  not furnish  an
explanation  for the  original  disturbance  to private  consumption.- 75 
C. Increase  in Inflation
Table  A2.4 shows  the  differences  fr)m  the  base  case Sor  a simulat rn
in  which inflation  increases  by 6  percentage  points  after  1990.  The  nominal
government  interest  rate is  assumed  to be fixed,  so the real  government
interest  rate  decreases. This  decreases  the  public  sector  deficit  by .3
percentage  points  of GDP.  At the same  time it increases  the  nominal  flow  of
finarcing  to the  government  for  the fixed  r&tio  to GDP  of public  debt to  the
financial  system. Since  private  holdings  of government  debt  are the residual
to reconcile  the  public  deficit  with its  financing,  these  holdirgs  decrease.
The  net effect  is a decline  in the  public  debt ratio,  which further  reduces
interest  costs  in the  latter  part of the  period. This a  virtuous  cycle  of
domestic  debt  decumulation  in  contrast  to the  vicious  cycle in  the  higher  real
interest  rate simulation.
Sirce  public  saving  increases  by .31  of GDP and the  current  account
deficit  and  private  investment  do not change,  pxivate  saving  muqt decrease  by
a commensurate  amount. However,  this  is also  the amount  by which  private
disposable  income  decreases  because  of the  lower  real  value  of interest
received  from the  public  sector,  so  private  consumption  itself  does not
change.
The private  sector  also  has higher  accumulation  of money  and  quasi-
money  to keep up  with the  higher  inflation. It finances  this  and its  decrease
in saving  through  the  reduction  in its  holding  of government  debt and  through
higher  credit  from the  financial  system.
The  economic  story  underlying  this simulation  would be that  credit
expansion  to the  private  sector  increases  inflation. The increase  in
inflation  lowers  the  government  deficit  and  private  disposable  income  by the
same  amount  because  of the  fixed  interest  rate  on government  debt,  which is
income  to the  private  sector  and  expenditure  for  the  public  sector. The
private  sector  maintains  consumption  at its  original  level  despite  its  drop in
disposable  income,  financed  by the  additional  credit  that it receives  from  the
monetary  system. Thus,  private  saving  decreases  by an amcunt  equal  to the
drop in the  public  deficit.
Therefore,  in this simulation  nothing  has really  changed  in real
terms. The only  change  is higher  inflation  due to an unexplained  credit
expansion  by the financial  system  to the  private  sector. The  government
receives,  and the  private  sector  pays,  an inflation  tax.  The financing  made
possible  by money  creation  goes to the  private  sector  to cover  its  payment  of
the inflation  tax,  while the  public  sector  debt  declines  as a ratio  to CDP.
D.  Conclusion
To summarize  the  comparative  simulation  results,  Figure  A2 shows  a
graph  of the  differences  from the  base  case in the  current  account  deficit,
public  resource  balance,  and  private  resource  balance.
In the  exchange  rate  appreciation  case,  we find the  public  deficit
improving'  slightly  because  of the lower  real  cost  of interest  on the external
debt.  The  counterpart  to the increased  current  account  deficit  is  a deterio-ration  in  tho  private  resource  balance,  vhich  is  due  to  higher  consumption  and
lower  saving.  This  contrasts  to  the  fiscal  closure,  where  the  higher  current
account  deficit  was  associated  with  a  larger  fiscal  deficit.  Similarly,  in
the  high  inflation  case  the  public  deficit  is  now  lower  (higher  public
resource  balance)  because  of  the  lover  real  interest  cost  on  the  domestic
debt. The  counterpart  is  again  lover  private  saving  and  higher  consumption.
Finally,  the  public  balance  deteriorates  in  the  case  of  higher  real  domestic
interest  rates  because  of  higher  total  interest  on  the  public  debt. The
counterpart  is  lower  investment  by  the  private  sector  in  response  to  the
higher  interest  rates.
Theose  simulation  results  show  the  outcome  of  changes  in  policy
targets  when  we  take  the  private  soctor  as  the  residual  in  conformity  with  the
traditional  RMSM. The  simulation  results  can  reproduce  outcomes  that  have
been  observed  in  various  countries  at  different  times: real  exchange  rate
appreciation  assocLated  with  a  private  consumption  boom,  high  real  interest
rates  and  a  consumption  boom,  and  inflation  associated  with  credit  expansion
to  the  private  sector.  However,  the  results  are  unsatisfactory  in  that  the
model  itself  does  not  explain  why  the  changes  in  private  bohavior  are  taking
place. (Tho  fiscal  closure  also  does  not  explain  why  the  public  sector
changes  its  behavior,  but  it  is  more  comon to  view  government  actions  as
inexplicable.)  In  its  current  version,  the  model  gives  more  satisfactory
results  with  a  fiscal  closure.  If  the  capability  to  reproduce  major  shifts  in
private  consumption  ratios  is  desired,  then  a  richer  specification  for  private
consumption  is  needed.  This  would  bo  more  appropriate  for  the  RMSM-XX  version
of  the  macro-modelling  exercise.7  77 
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TABLE  A2.2
SIMULATION  DIFFERENCES  FROM  9ASE  CASE
PRIVATE  CLOSURE
EXCHANGE  RATE  APPRECIATION
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1996
CDP Growth  Rate  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00  0.00
Investment  Growth  Rate  0.11%  0.11O  0.11%  0.11:  0.11%  0.10%
Private  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00°  0.00°  0.001
Public  0.35%  0.36%  0.34%  0.34%  0.33%  0.33X
CDP per  capita  Growth  Rate  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00O
Consumption  pop  capita  growth  rate  0.19%  0.19X  0.19%  0.19%  0.19%  0.18%
arose  Inv*stment/GDP  *0.06%  -0.09%  -0.14%  -0.18X  -0.23%  -0.27%
Domestic  Savings/CDP  -0.22%  -0,46X  -0.70A  -0.86%  -1.04%  -1.20%
Notiotlal  Savirjs/GDP  -0.1S%  -0.391  -0.61%  -0.77%  -0.961  -1.13X
Marginal  Notional  Savings  Rate  -1.57%  -2.371  -2.53%  -3.29%  -3.69%  -4.03%
Private  Investment/CDP  -0.06%  -0  09'X  -0.14%  -0.18%  -0.23X  -0.27%
Private  Consueption/COP  0.22%  0.460  0.70X  0.  8S  1.04%  1.201
Private  Savings/GDP  -0.21%  -0.43X  -0.67X  -0.84%  -1.02X  -1.18%
Private  Resource  Balance/GDP  -0.16%  -0.34X  -0.63X  -0.66X  -0.79%  -0.911
Public  Investment/CDP  0.00%  0.001  0.001  C.00C  0.00%  0.00%
Public  Sovings/GO  0.03X  0.04X  0.06X  0.07X  0.060  0.06%
Public  Rov*nues/GDP  -0.03%  -0.06X  -0.09%  -0.12X  -O0.bX  -0.18X
Public  Expenditures/GOP  -0.08%  -0.10%  -0.181  -0.19%  -0.21%  -0.23%
Public  Doficit/GDP  -0.03%  -0.04%  -0.061  -0.07%  -0.06%  -0.06%
MLT  External  Financing  -0.02%  -0.06%  -0.061  -0.061  -0.081  -0.11%
ST  External  Financing  0.00  0.00  0.001  0.00  0.00%  0.00%
Dometic financing-financial  system  0.001  0.00  0.001  0.001  0.00  0.00%
Domestic  financing-private  sector  -0.01  O.OOX  -O.OOX  -0.001  0.02X  0.06%
Reoldual  0.00%  . OOOX  0.001  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Real  exchange  rate  index  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.11
Real  Exchang Rate  Doepreciation(-)  1.801  1.801  1.80X  1.801  1.80%  1.60%
Dow..stic  Inflation  0.00  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00%  0.00%
Exchango  Rate  Depreciation  -2.06%  -2  041  -2.04  -2.041  -2.04%  -2.04X
Nominal  Interost  Rate  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Real  Interest  Rate  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00°  0.00%
Govornment  Interest  Rate  0.00  %  O.1  O.00X  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Stock  of  HI/GDP  -0.00%  -0.00%  -0.00%  -0.00%  -0.00%  0.001
Stock  of  Quasi-money/COP  0.00%  0.001  O.OOX  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Stock  of  crod.t  to private  soctor/GOP  0.16%  0.601  0.961  1.44%  1.98%  2.571
Export  Growth  Rate  -0.39%  -0.36X  -0.34%  -0.38%  -0.38X  -0.37%
Growth  rate  manufacturing  ox.orts  -1.42%  -1.42%  -1.42%  -1.42%  -1.42X  -1.42X
Exports/GDP  -0.37X  -0.765  -1.131  -1.43X  -1.76%  -2.04X
Import  Crowtk  Rate  0.61X  0.61X  0.62X  0.62%  0.83X  0.63%
Growth  rate  intermediate  mports  0,41%  0.41X  0.41X  0.41%  0.41%  0.41%
Crowth  rate  private  capital  imports  0.92X  0.92X  0.92X  0.92X  0.921  0.92%
Growth  rate  private  cons  imports  1.99%  1.98%  1.99S  1.991  1.981  1.98%
Imports/GDP  -0.19X  -0.38X  -0.571  -0.76X  -0.93%  -1.11%
Current  Account  Deficit  (in  USImillion)  72  162  274  409  570  766
Current  Account  Dficit/GWP  0.13X  0.30X  0.471  0.591  0.73X  0.86%
Not International  Reorves  (USImillion)  -72  -233  -C07  -916  -1467  -2253
Net  Resrves (in  menthe  imports)  -0.7  -0.4  -0.a  -1.3  -1.3  -2.5
Total  External  C*bt  Ratio  -0.63X  -1.18%  -1.6%  -2.065  -2.38X  -2.681
Publie  Debt  Ratio  -0.57%  -1.061  -1.49S  -1.101  -2.165  -2.39%-80  -
TAJILE  A2.3
SIMULATION  DIFFE  RNcES  FROM  SASE CASE
PRIVATE  CLOSURE
HIGH  INTEREST  RATE
1990  1991  1992  1990  1994  199C
GOP  Growth  Rate  0.00  O.0OOX 0.001  0.OOX  0.00!  0.00!
Investment  Growth  Rate  -2.43X  0.00  0.00111  --. 001  .0.001  -0.001
Private  -I  t8111-  0.oOX  0o.OO  0.OOX  0.001  0  o0.o
Public  0.00  0.OOX  0.00X  O.OOX  0.001  O.OOX
GOP  per  capita  Growth  Rate  0.0OX  0.001  0.OO  0.001  0.001  0.001
Consumption  per  capita  Rrowth rate  0.531  0.001  0.01X  -0.00X -0.00X -O.OOX
Gross  Invw  ootnt/C  U  -0.461 -0.411  -0.411  -0.491  -0.46S  -0.46!
Do  mtic  Savings/C1P  -0.405 -0.40X -0.40X -0.40X -0.401 -0.401
National  Svings/COP  -0.40X  -0.39X  -0.39N -O.S  -0.3X11,  -0.3OJ
Marginal  National  Savin  Rate  -10.33X  -0.29t  -0.2tX  -0.231  -0.31X  -0.291
Private  Investment/CP  -0.411  -0.461  -0.461  -0.461  -0.461  -0.461
Private  Consumption/GDP  0.401  0.40X  0.401  0.403  0.40X  0.401
Private  Svihoga/GP  0.131  0.32X  0.461  0.1S  0.75X  0.J91
Prlvate  Resource Elance/CDP  0.021  08111  0.94X  1.09X  1.23X  1.371
Public  Investment/COP  0.003  0.001  0.010  0.001  0.001  0,OO Public  SavingsaGOP  -0.531 -0.72X -0.04X -0.99X -1.13X  -1.261
Public  Revenu'os/W0P  -O.OlX -O.OlX -OOX  -O.OlX -O.OlX -0.01X
PublIc  EAp4nditUe4/GOP  0.521  0.70  0.31  3X  o.m  1.12X  1.261
Public  Deficit/GOP  0.53X  0.722  0.  04X  0993  1.13X  1.26X
MLT  External  Financing  0.00%  0.0011O 0.0  O.OOX  0.001  0  OOX ST External  Fina  ;ing  0.0011 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
Dometic  financing-fnaneclal  system  0.0011  0.001  0.00111  0OX  O.OOX  0.OO0
Domestie  financing-private  sector  0.53111  0.725  0.64X  0.91X  1.13t  1.261
Residual  0.0011#  0.0011O  0.00111O  0.001  0.001  0.001
Real ;e:hange  rate  indx  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Real  Exhang Rate  Doepreciation(-)  0.001  . .OOX  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
Domestic  Inflation  0.0011  0.00  0.001  0.001  0.0011  0.001
Exchange  Rote  Depreciation  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.OO  0.00%
Nominal  Interest  Rate  6.993  6. 1  6.92X  6.92!  92!  8.923
Real  Intcrest  Rat.  7.31X  7.31X  7?.13  7.31%  7.313  7  313
Govcenment  Interest  Rate  8.41X  6934X  8.34X  6.34X  1.34X  8.34X
Stock  of  Mi/GOP  0.00  -O.OOX  0.00111 0.001  -O.OOX  -0.00!
Stock  of  Quasi-money/GOP  2.29X  2.29X  2.29X  2.292  2.29X  2.29!
Stock  of  credit  to  priv-te  sctor/COP  3.62X  3.711  3.691  3.633  3.69X  3.S5i
Export  Growth  Rate  0.001  O.OOX  0.001  0.00  0.00!  0.00!
Growth  rate  manufacturing  exports  0.0011 0.001t 0.001  0.00  0.00%  0.00x
Expo  -OP  0.00111O  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00!
Impor  .rewth  Rate  -0.54t  -0.001  -0.001  O  .001  0.001  0.00!
Gro%,h rate  intered;ite  imports  0.001  0.001  0.00X  0.001  0.00!  0.00! Croeth  rate  privote  capital  imports  -UUX  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00x
Growth rate  private  coos  Imports  0.613  0.00  0.0131  -0.0111  0.00X  -0.O00
Imprts/WO  -0.061  -0.011  -0.011  -0.061  -0.061  -0.061
Curront  Account Dof!elt  (in  USSmill;on)  .^U  -44  -51  -59  -d6  -76
Current  Account De1lJct/4  P  -0.003  -0.09  .03  -0.10C  -0.10X  -0.10X
Not International  Ret  rves (USSmillion)  so  U  134  193  259  335
Net Reerves  (in  mnthe lmports)  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4
Total  External  De"  Raotlo  0.001  0.001  0.0011 0.001  0.1  0.001
Public  D,bt  Rati  0.5331 1.14X  1.741  2.361  2.9093  3.*2- Si  -
TABLE  A2.4
SIWULATION  DIFFERENCES  FROM  BASE  CASE
PRIVATE  CLOSURE
HIGH  INFLATION
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1996
GOP  Growth  Rate  -0.00  0.00%  0.00  -0.00!  -0.00%  -0.00!
Investment  Growth  Pato  0.00!  0.00%  0.00!  -0.00!  0.00%  -0.00%
Private  0.00!  0.010  . OOOX  0.00  O.OOX  0.00
Public  O.OOX  -0.00!  0.00  -0.00  0.00%  -0.00%
COP  per  capita  Growth  Rate  -0.00!  O.OOX  0.00!  -O.OX  -0.OOX  -0.00!
Consumption  per  capita  growth  rate  -0.00!  0.00%  0.00!  0.00!  -O.OOX  -O.OX
Cross  Investment/CDP  0.001  -0.001  0.0OX  0.00!  0.00!  0.00!
Domestic  Savings/CDP  0.001  0.0011  0.001  0.00  0.00!  0.00!
National  Savings/GOP  0.00!  0.00!  0.0011  0.00!  0.00  0.00%
Warginal  National  Savings  Rato  0.001  0.0OX  0.00!  -O.OOX  0.00  OOCX
Private  Investment/CDP  O.OOX  0.001  0.  OOOX  0.00!  0.00  0.00!
Private  Consumption/GOP  -0.00  0.0OX  -0.0OX  O.OOX  0.001  0.00
Private  Savings/GDP  -0.04!  -0.091  -0.14X  -0.18X  -0.22X  -0.26%
Private  Resoureo  Balanem/COP  -0.04!  -0.09X  -0.14X  -0.13X  -0.22!  -0.26%
Public  Investment/GOP  0.00  -0.001  0.0OX  0.00!  0.001  0.0OX
Public  Savings/GDP  0.04!  0.09  0.14X  0.16X  0.22!  0.26!
Public  Revonuos/GDP  0.00!  -O.OOX  -0.00!  0.00!  0.00!  0.00%
Public  Expenditures/COP  -0.04!  -0.09X  -0.14%  -0.13X  -0.22%  -0 26%
Public  Defieit/GOP  -0.04X  -0.09X  -0.14X  -0.18X  -0.22%  -0.26X
MLT  External  Finaocing  0.001  0.00  0.00!1  0.001  0.001  0.00
ST  External  Financing  0.0011  0.0011  0  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.0OX
Domestic  financing-financial  system  0.14X  0.17!  0.17!  0.17!  0.17!  0.17T
Domostic  financing-private  soector  -0.19X  -0.27X  -0.31!  -0.34!  -0.40X  -0.43!
Rosidual  O.OOS  0.00#  0.001  0.OO  0. OOX  0.001
Real  exchange  rate  indoex  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Real  Exchango  Rate  Depreciation(-)  0.00!  0.0OX  0.00!  0.001  0.00  0.00!
Domestic  Inflation  6.00X  6.00  6.001;  6.00X  6.00!  6.00%
Exchange  Rate  Depreciation  4.74X  65.9X  C.09%  5.69  65.69X  65.9%
Nominal  Interest  Rate  5.13!  6.16X  6.161  6.161  6.16!  6.16!
Real  Intorest  Rate  0.00%  0.001  O.OOX  O.OOX  0.00!  0.00!
Government  Interest  Rate  -0.00  -0.00  -0.001  -0.00%  -0.00  -0.00%
Stock  of  MI/GDP  -0.111  -0.131  -0.13X  -0.13X  -0.13!  -0.13!
Stock  of Quasi-money/GOP  -0.00!  0.00!  0.00!  O.OOX  -0.00!  .0.00%
Stock  of credit  to private  sectur/GDP  0.01!X  0.01  0.19X  0.31%  0.36!  0.42%
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Total  External  Debt  Ratio  O.OO  0.0S  0.OO  0.00111 0.IO.J  0.00!
Public  Dobt  Ratio  -0.26S -0.64X -0.961 -1.26C -1.3!U -1.73$- 32 -
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